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On May 1, 2003, President George W. Bush declared the mission in the Iraq War 
accomplished. Three years later, Iraq was on fire. Immediately after the removal of Saddam 
Hussein in April of 2003, the streets and neighborhoods of Iraq began to flood with increasing 
violence. By 2006, a sectarian civil war and a furious insurgency engulfed the nation in a pyre, 
creating a war zone attracting fundamentalist terror groups from around the world. Iraqi civilians 
were being caught in the cross fires of both sub-conflicts every day. Within the first six months 
of that year, approximately 14,000 Iraqis had died, with 3,000 of those deaths occurring in June 
of 2006 alone. To make matters worse, the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) began to become actively 
engaged in the sectarian conflict in some parts of the nation as well. Disappearances among 
civilians for ransoms became regular and daily car bombs littered the nation’s public spaces.
1
 
Death was around nearly every corner. While the Bush administration claimed that Iraq had been 
liberated three years prior, the steady rise of violence that culminated in the complete breakdown 
of social order between 2006 and 2007 was a clear indicator that the mission had, indeed, not 
been accomplished.  
The events of 2006 and 2007, thus, marked a failure of the United States in achieving its 
outlined goals as defined by the Bush administration. Stability had not been established 
throughout the nation, and Iraq had become a beehive for terrorist groups.
2
 Iraq was a hopeless 
pit of tragedy and suffering. Hayder Mohammed Jodah, a Baghdad native, recalls the loss of 
Iraq’s new hope,  
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All of us were fully supportive of the American invasion. We were glad to see Saddam go…we 
were looking forward to a better life…But it didn’t turn out the way we had hoped. We wound up 
suffering more as a family after the invasion than we did during Saddam times.3 
By 2006, Iraq had become the epicenter of turmoil in the Middle East, the polar opposite of what 
the Bush administration had hoped for earlier. Although the administration intended to establish 
a friendlier image of America among Iraqis, resentment towards the United States spiked as the 
nation plunged into carnage.  
 The cause of the mayhem that defined the period between 2006 and 2007 starts with the 
Bush administration’s management of post-Saddam Iraq. The United States failed to stabilize 
Iraq by 2006 in part because the Bush administration operated with a complete lack of viable, 
strategic planning. While U.S. efforts were often well intended, they lacked the guidance and 
conceptual understanding from the Bush administration to transform their goals into a reality. 
This allowed for the implementation of various policies that ultimately alienated the population 
over time and, in many ways, promoted instability.   
The absence of a comprehensive strategic direction resulted in reconstruction efforts that 
were incapable of restoring social order and security to Iraq. By failing to provide Iraqis with 
basic needs and services, the Bush administration increasingly lost Iraqi public support and as 
Iraqis increasingly felt oppressed rather than liberated. A fissure began to develop between the 
two, and it only widened over time. Waning Iraqi support for U.S. efforts was a critical issue that 
the Bush administration found itself unable to address. In doing so, they ultimately failed to 
maintain their initial image as liberators, a fundamental prerequisite for all hopes of America’s 
success in Iraq. Conversely, as the Bush administration lost America’s title as a liberator, they 
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laid the foundation for Iraqis to dub them as occupiers, an image that would make failure in Iraq 
inevitable.    
In order to accurately explain the causation of the events of 2006 and 2007, however, the 
initial years of the Iraq War must be understood from a military viewpoint as well. While the 
Bush administration’s policies contributed to the crucial shift in Iraqi opinion between 2003 and 
2006, the policies implemented by the U.S. military also proved to have destabilizing effects. 
U.S. soldiers often worked around the clock to establish order in post-Saddam Iraq. Yet, scores 
of blood, sweat, and tears were shed to no avail. The explanation of the aforementioned 
discrepancy lies within the military’s strategic vision. 
The military adopted an operational mindset prior to 2006 that was fundamentally 
combat-oriented rather than peacekeeping-oriented. Within this strategic framework, the military 
engaged in operations that ironically alienated the Iraqi population in its pursuit to win their 
hearts and minds, thus, exacerbating the destabilizing and estranging effects of the policies that 
the Bush administration implemented. These two themes will serve as a viable explanation as to 

























Strategic Goals – What the Bush Administration Wanted to Achieve in Iraq 
 The Bush administration’s primary and immediate goal was to remove Saddam Hussein 
from power and install a friendly regime in his place. They viewed Saddam’s regime to be a 
danger to the United States due to its strong anti-American sentiment, which, they understood to 
act as a promoter of hostilities in the Middle East. COBRA II, the official U.S. war plans for 
Iraq, states the Bush administration’s goals in Iraq clearly, “The purpose of this operation is to 
force the collapse of the Iraqi regime and deny it the use of WMD [Weapons of Mass 
Destruction] to threaten its neighbors and U.S. interests in regions…the end-state for this 
operation is regime change…”
4
 Through toppling Saddam’s regime, the Bush administration 
believed that the world would have one less potential safe-haven for anti-U.S. militant groups. 
Success in the Iraq War would provide the U.S. with a much-needed ally in the region and the 




Yet, the administration also hoped to achieve much broader goals in Iraq as well. The 
establishment of a new political apparatus would also serve as a beacon of light for the rest of the 
Middle East. The administration saw that many nations in the region were on increasingly poor 
relations with the United States, its allies, and its interests. Therefore, they hoped for the new 
Iraqi regime to serve as a source of de-escalation in what they viewed to be a growing hot spot 
for anti-U.S. sentiment in the world.
6
 Charles Dunne, the Director for Iraq at the National 
Security Council between 2005 and 2007, elaborates further, 
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…the central ideological aim of the war was highlighted by Bush in a November 2003 speech to 
the National Endowment for Democracy. This was the promotion of democracy in Iraq as the 
foundation for its extension throughout the Middle East. In his speech, Bush noted that ‘the 
establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global 
democratic revolution.’7 
Through initiating Iraq’s path to freedom and democracy, the Bush administration believed that 
it could instill a friendlier image of America in Arab minds while simultaneously inspiring other 
nations in the Middle East to follow Iraq’s example through democratization as well.
8
 A new 
democratic Iraq, therefore, would act as a lighthouse within a sea of antagonism , ready to guide 
resentment in the Middle East into pacification.  
While removing Saddam’s regime was the administration’s immediate and short-term 
response to terrorism, establishing a democracy in the Middle East was their long-term objective 
of combating terrorism. The administration believed that a democracy in Iraq could create a 
domino effect reaction throughout the Middle East in which anti-American sentiments would 
collapse piece by piece. Anthony Shadid, a journalist who followed the early years of the war 
closely, explains the administration’s mindset, “If we can change Iraq, George W. Bush and his 
determined lieutenants maintained, we can change the Arab World, so precariously adrift after 
decades of broken promises of progress and prosperity.”
9
 The Bush administration, therefore, 
understood Iraq to be the West’s second chance in the Middle East. Through liberating Iraqis 
from a tyrant and providing them with the opportunity to rebuild their own nation in a 
democratic manner, the administration believed that it could attack anti-American sentiment 
from its roots through chipping away at the desire in the Arab world for terror directed at the 
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United States. The hearts and minds of Iraqis, therefore, had to be won in order for the Bush 
administration to achieve their objectives. 
Analyzing the Bush administration’s war plans, however, unearths flaws in their strategic 
thinking. The administration’s crucial strategic fallacies provide a foundation for understanding 
why their attempts at reconstruction ended in failure. Clearly, the Bush administration had two 
issues at stake as they embarked on their mission in Iraq. On the one hand, they faced regime 
change, and on the other, they faced a much more complex issue of democratizing and pacifying 
the entire Middle East. These two separate issues needed to be addressed with full attention on 
their own. The success or failure of one would not necessarily guarantee the same outcome for 
the other. Yet, examining the Bush administration’s planning suggests that many key members 
were not fully aware of this dynamic.  
Rumsfeld’s Strategic Approach - How the Defense Department Planned to Have No Plan 
 As one of the main leaders in pre-war planning, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
focused the bulk of his efforts on achieving the administration’s first objective. Rumsfeld’s 
planning was centered on assessing the most efficient way to topple Saddam Hussein. He 
believed that the key to the Iraq War was quickly defeating Iraqi military forces while making a 
mad dash to Baghdad to overthrow Saddam’s regime with speed. He asserted that if the 
Department of Defense (DoD) could reorganize the United States’ military into a Network-
Centric Warfare (NCW) oriented fighting force, he could achieve his central objective of getting 
in and out of Iraq as quickly as possible.
10
 A question Rumsfeld posed to CENTCOM (Central 
Command) commander Tommy Franks in January of 2002 embodies his prioritization of a quick 
                                               
10 Frederick W. Kagan, Finding the Target: The Transformation of American Military Policy, (New York: 
Encounter Books, 2006), 328. 
9 
 
conflict, “If dozens of key targets could be destroyed simultaneously, would that put pressure on 
the regime, cause it to crumble, and preclude the need for a long war requiring a large force?”
11
 
It is quite clear that Rumsfeld planned extensively for the administration’s first set of objectives 
of removing Saddam from power. Through focusing on NCW and quick regime change, 
Rumsfeld and the rest of the DoD planned the war so that a protracted occupation could be 
avoided. However, in doing so, he widely ignored planning for the stabilization of Iraq - the key 
factor to achieving their second set of political objectives.
12
 
Rumsfeld prioritized the ability of the United States to withdraw its armed forces with 
agility over anything else primarily because he saw a prolonged occupation to be inherently 
counterproductive to U.S. goals in Iraq. Rumsfeld and the rest of the DoD asserted that a long 
occupation would create a “culture of dependence” among Iraqis and foster an expectation for 
the U.S. to govern and administer Iraqi society.
13
 Furthermore, they believed that a U.S. 
occupation would be met with great resentment among the population because Iraqi politics were 
intrinsically hostile towards the United States.
14
 With these assumptions about post-Saddam Iraq, 
the Bush administration concluded that major reconstruction efforts were simply a job that was 
not theirs to have. Despite the administration’s goal of establishing a democratic, pro-U.S. 
political apparatus, planners within the DoD treated nation building as a matter to be left up to 
the international community and Iraqis themselves.
15
  
One can see the inherent flaws in the Bush administration’s reasoning as they set 
extensive planning for reconstruction operations, otherwise known as Phase IV, on the 
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backburner. They hoped to change the politics of Iraq through military force, while abandoning 
the bulk of the reconstruction efforts that were to follow. In other words, the Bush administration 
adopted an end plan in which they would have their cake and eat it too.  
The question remains, however, as to how the Bush administration concluded that it 
could and would achieve its defined goals in Iraq while largely ignoring the importance of Phase 
IV. The answer to this lies in their overestimated trust placed in exiled Iraqi political leaders, 
which created a false sense of reality in what was to come in Iraq.
16
 The Bush administration 
invited large numbers of Iraqi political exiles to act as advisers in drafting plans for Phase IV. 
The most notable among these exiled politicians was Ahmad Chalabi. 
Chalabi, a well-known Iraqi politician throughout Washington, was staunchly opposed to 
Saddam from the onset of his career, and had been lobbying for regime change in Iraq since the 
Clinton administration. He demonstrated his anti-Saddam sentiments clearly in 1992 when he 
founded the Iraqi National Congress, a political party with the specific goal of removing Saddam 
from power.
17
 His political ideology was similar to that of the Bush administration’s war hawks 
in that he, too, pushed for swift and decisive military action in Iraq to replace Saddam Hussein 
with a new democratic government.
18
 With his anti-Saddam political background and strong 
support for invasion, Chalabi was one of the administration’s most trusted Iraqi advisers. Yet, 
Chalabi was desperate in his desire to remove Saddam and was willing to exaggerate and bend 
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the intelligence he provided to the administration if it facilitated the assurance of invasion.
19
 The 
Bush administration failed to see past this and mistakenly took his advisory intelligence to heart. 
Chalabi asserted that the vast majority of the Iraqi population yearned for America’s 
arrival to overthrow the brutal dictatorship. He even went as far as claiming that most Iraqis 
would greet American troops with “roses and sweets.”
20
 Chalabi and many other Iraqi exiles 
went further to claim that both the Iraqi infrastructure and administrative apparatus would largely 
remain intact and functional upon the removal of Saddam Hussein.
21
 In making these claims, 
Chalabi depicted Iraq as the perfect case for an in-and-out war. Ultimately, he was successful in 
convincing Rumsfeld, Bush, and the rest of the administration that winning the hearts and minds 
of the Iraqi population could be achieved by simply relieving the nation of their oppressive 
dictator.  
While Chalabi’s claims may have had some truth to them, it is clear that he used his role 
as the most trusted Iraqi advisor to manipulate the administration into invading Iraq. Chalabi saw 
the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as his opportunity to finally achieve what he had been 
lobbying for in Washington for so long.  Invading Iraq was a tough sell by any standards due to 
its limited connections with 9/11. However, Chalabi presented it as an opportunity for the United 
States to pacify anti-American sentiments in the Middle East with ease and minimal burdens, 
thus making it a proposition difficult to refuse. While he was aware that his infamous “roses and 
sweets” comment was overly optimistic and plainly false in some areas of the country, he knew 
that it would depict Iraq to the administration as a short war with massive long-term political 
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 Yet, in doing so, Chalabi led the Bush administration to believe that Iraq would 
essentially reconstruct itself and not require extensive plans for Phase IV.  
Based on the expectations and assumptions established by Chalabi, military operations 
were planned accordingly. Rumsfeld and the rest of the administration believed that they had no 
reason to commit more troops and resources to Iraq than required to bring down Saddam. After 
all, their intelligence suggested that post-war security requirements would be at most minimal. 
Thus, Rumsfeld planned military operations in Iraq to be focused on defeating Saddam’s military 
forces.
23
 Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, explained the reasoning 
behind these strong expectations in an interview in November of 2003, “…nobody planned for 
security because Ahmad Chalabi told us everything was going to be swell”.
24
 With the 
anticipation for the post-war situation to be innately stable, the Bush administration concluded 
that a force capable of providing stabilization was unwarranted and excessive for victory.  
As Rumsfeld began collaborating with CENTCOM commander General Tommy Franks, 
he made the consolidation of troop levels a top priority. Franks initially proposed in December of 
2001 that approximately 500,000 troops would be required to successfully manage regime 
change. Yet, a month later in January of 2002, Rumsfeld strongly urged Franks to reconsider. 
Franks dutifully responded later that month with a much lower number of approximately 105,000 
troops needed to defeat Saddam Hussein.
25
 Ultimately, the administration settled on entering Iraq 
with three small Army divisions, one Marine division, and a British coalition division: which 
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amounted to approximately 145,000 men.
26
 Thomas Ricks, a journalist who covered the war 
early on, explains Rumsfeld and the DoD’s adamancy over the consolidation of forces,  
The war plans called for additional forces to be sent after the fall of Baghdad…but the two top 
civilians at the Pentagon remained skeptical. ‘I don’t see why it would take more troops to occupy 
the country than to take down the regime,’ Wolfowitz said in one meeting…Rumsfeld had similar 
reservations…27 
Rumsfeld was set on keeping the Iraq War a short conflict like Chalabi made it out to be. He 
believed that sending massive numbers of troops to Iraq had the potential of bogging U.S. forces 
down for a useless mission. If the U.S. military would not have to worry about security and 
stability in post-Saddam Iraq, then Rumsfeld saw no justification in sending over a force 
centered on those objectives.  
Rumsfeld also altered the administration’s war plans as time went on so that the relatively 
small U.S. force would be used solely for the invasion and removal of Saddam’s regime rather 
than an occupation. Although the original plans called for the invading force to be reinforced 
after Baghdad’s fall, Rumsfeld and the DoD concluded that reinforcements would have the same 
aforementioned effects of initially sending over a large fighting force.  Approximately fourteen 
Coalition combat brigades entered Iraq in March 2003, and that number was supposed to rise to 
approximately twenty-five in order to reach troop level requirements to execute the objectives of 
Phase IV. Yet, Rumsfeld canceled the deployment of the reinforcements, and implemented an 
immediate drawdown of the 145,000 troops. For example, the 1
st
 Cavalry Division was 
scheduled to receive three additional combat brigades to secure their specified areas, however, 
Rumsfeld canceled their deployment as Saddam’s removal suggested that the mission was 
already accomplished. The 82
nd
 Airborne Division began their extraction almost instantly after 
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Saddam’s removal as well.
28
 It is apparent that the administration’s strict adherence to Chalabi’s 
predictions regarding the invasion’s aftermath led them to treat security and social order as 
afterthoughts. 
Overly optimistic intelligence also dictated planning for civilian operations in post-war 
Iraq. The Bush administration believed that Iraq’s infrastructure would remain largely functional 
and that basic services could be reinstituted with ease, just as Chalabi had previously explained. 
Therefore, they planned for a rather small administrative body, with nowhere near the 
capabilities required to run a country, to assume authority immediately after Saddam’s removal. 
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) was tasked with overseeing 
Iraq’s infrastructure and restoring utilities such as electricity and water to the public. However, 
Rumsfeld, a doubter of Bush’s greater nation-building ambitions of the Iraq War from the 
beginning, had envisioned ORHA to be a humanitarian organization, capable of providing food 
and basic aid to refugees.
29
 Conversely, establishing governance and enforcing order in a lawless 
environment were not tasks ORHA was designed to handle. This explains ORHA’s failure in 
addressing the issues that were to develop in the early aftermath of the invasion.
30
 Rumsfeld and 
the DoD simply did not expect massive administrative requirements in post-war Iraq, nor did he 
believe that the United States should be responsible for such demands if they arose, therefore, 
extensive planning for civilian operations were close to nonexistent prior to the war.  
In accordance with Rumsfeld’s reluctance to commit to a major occupation, the Bush 
administration intended to return power to Iraqis soon after major combat operations ceased. 
After reinstating social order in Iraq, the governing authority would transfer power to a 
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transitional Iraqi government in quick increments. The transitional authority would then lead the 
nation into drafting its own constitution and elections for a democratic government.
31
 While the 
Bush administration had not formally appointed a governing body to become the transitional 
authority in Iraq, they had strongly hoped for Ahmad Chalabi and his supporters to play a 
prominent role in developing a legitimate transitional government shortly after Saddam’s 
removal.
32
 A massive troop drawdown would begin almost immediately after the removal of 
Saddam Hussein, and the DoD predicted ORHA to leave Baghdad by August of 2003.
33
 Hence, 
the entire process of reestablishing governance and completely overhauling Iraq’s political 
apparatus would implement the administration’s in-and-out doctrine. 
  With the administration’s sources of intelligence in mind, it is conceivable why Rumsfeld 
prioritized planning for the invasion over all other aspects of the war. The Bush administration 
saw that they could indeed achieve their political end in Iraq while avoiding a major occupation 
because of the nature of the Iraqi population’s condition.
34
 As Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz explained in a Senate hearing on February 25, 2003, “Based on what he [Wolfowitz] 
had heard about Iraq from them, he said, ‘I am reasonably certain that they will greet us as 
liberators, and that will help us keep requirements [troop levels] down.’”
35
 The Bush 
administration adopted a set of plans that heavily relied on a set of expectations, which, to begin 
with, were debatable at best. Their refusal to commit resources for extensive post-combat plans 
was a conscious decision to make a wager that the situation in Iraq would pan out the way they 
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projected it to be. It was a wager that proved to be fatal to the administration’s defined goals for 
the war.  
How the U.S. Occupation Alienated Iraqis 
The occupation that immediately followed Saddam’s removal failed to address what was 
at stake in their operations. Iraqi public support was the foundation for the administration’s 
success in the war. Without the faith and confidence of the majority of Iraqis, insurgency and 
destabilization would inevitably ensue, rendering the administration’s efforts a failure. The main 
issue the Bush administration faced in post-Saddam Iraq was the inherently precarious nature of 
Iraqi support. As most Iraqis saw things, their support rested on a simple yet critical question 
posed to the Bush administration: did the Americans come to their country as liberators or 
occupiers?
36
 The Bush administration’s success or failure in the Iraq War rested on how the 
majority of Iraqis would answer this question in the coming months.   
The precariousness of Iraqi support is perhaps best understood in briefly analyzing Arab 
culture, which dictates that one must first witness another’s actions over a period of time in order 
to understand where their intentions truly lie. This holds especially true for foreigners with a 
reputation in the Arab world as being dishonest with their intentions, such as previously colonial 
Western powers.
37
 Shadid’s interaction with Faleh Hassan, a restaurant owner present at the 
infamous removal of Saddam’s statue in Firdos square, demonstrates Iraqi apprehension and 
hesitancy towards U.S. support,  
He was thankful for Saddam’s end, but in a sentiment I heard often that day, still suspicious of the 
Americans. ‘We feel peaceful and we feel relieved, but we are still frightened by tomorrow…We 
will see the American and British intentions over the next few months. People were oppressed for 
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thirty years. They’re looking for hope. They hope there will be a change, because people are fed 
up with what has happened before’.38 
 
While many Iraqis were excited with the removal of Saddam’s oppressive regime, they also 
remained skeptical of U.S. intentions immediately after the invasion. Iraqis were reluctant to give 
the Bush administration their full support until they fulfilled their promises of providing the 
nation with the foundation to have a better life. 
 It is worth noting that for many Iraqis, freedom from oppression was not synonymous 
with freedom from Saddam. Rather, freedom from Saddam was the first step. To most Iraqis, 
liberation meant a new life. It meant the opportunity to live their lives as they wish in safety - a 
basic ambition denied under thirty years of dictatorship.
39
 Therefore, proving that America had 
come to Iraq as a liberator entailed much more than regime change. Rather, it required the 
assurance of prosperity as well. 
The Bush administration had a clear opportunity to develop Iraqi hope into support 
through policies that would fulfill their promises of liberating Iraqis from oppression. However, 
the feasibility of achieving this transformation rested in a window of opportunity that was brief 
at best. In hindsight, a Pentagon advisory panel seemed to have been correct in their assessment 
of the situation when they claimed, in July of 2003, that, “The window of opportunity for the 
CPA to turn things around in Iraq is closing rapidly.”
40
 Shadid’s interview with Wamidh 
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Nadhme provides further evidence for this claim, “How long did they have [to win the support of 
the Iraqi population]? I asked him. Two to three months, he told me. Judging by what I had seen 
in Baghdad so far…I wondered if the window hadn’t already closed”.
41
 With Saddam’s regime 
removed from power, the Bush administration was faced with a wobbly situation in which the 
support of the population, while shaky at best and prone to being lost easily, had to have been 
secured quickly.  
Polls taken on Iraqi opinion immediately after the invasion showed that a small window 
of opportunity, indeed, existed. Initially, 46% of the country saw the United States as liberators, 
whereas 43% saw the United States as occupiers. Yet, when the same poll was taken in October 
of 2003, more than two-thirds of the Iraqi populous viewed the United States as a hostile 
occupying force and only 15% continued to see them as liberators.
42
 Polls taken from city to city 
show the same trend as a survey of Baghdad in early 2003 claimed that 41% of the city saw the 
United States as liberators and 40% saw them as occupiers. Yet, 82% of Baghdadis saw the U.S. 
as occupiers and only 4% still saw them as liberators when the same poll was taken in the spring 
of 2004.
43
 Finally, polls taken in August of 2003 in Basra, Ramadi, Mosul, and Kirkuk showed 
that 47% of Iraqis claimed that any attacks on U.S. or Coalition troops were an act of resistance 
to occupiers.
44
 Clearly, a substantial portion of Iraqis were willing to give the United States a 
chance to finish their jobs and fulfill their promises of creating a foundation for a stable 
democracy. While the margin between Iraqis who initially supported U.S. efforts and those who 
did not were very narrow, the former still had a majority nonetheless that the Bush 
administration could have capitalized on to secure their political goal in Iraq. The clock was 
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ticking, and the administration did not have long before they passed the threshold of successfully 
winning the hearts and minds of Iraq.
45
 
  As U.S. forces pressed forward towards Baghdad, they left a trail of cities without any 
source of authority or governance. Jay Garner, the Director of ORHA, had been pressing General 
Franks for clearance to enter Iraq as soon as combat operations had started in order to resume 
services in Iraq and begin massive humanitarian assistance. To his dismay, Garner did not 
receive the green light until April 20, 2003, a full month after combat operations had started in 
March 20, 2003.
46
 Meanwhile, Iraqi cities remained stagnant in anarchy as they waited for 
humanitarian aid and the restoration of utilities and security. As a result, looting and lawlessness 
immediately began to engulf Iraq.  
 Although U.S. troops still had a sizeable presence on the ground, they never received 
direct orders to intervene in the chaos that followed the removal of Saddam Hussein. The DoD 
had prioritized the abolition of all former regime elements and remnants of Ba’athist loyalists. 
Thus, commanders were forced to order their men to stand by as the looting went on while U.S. 
forces were preoccupied with searching for Saddam Hussein and his top officials.
47
 Lieutenant 
Douglas Hoyt of the 3
rd
 Infantry Division recalls standing idle as Iraq was being pillaged, “‘I 
remember looking through the sights on my tank at people and trying to determine if they were 
hostile or not…We didn’t stop them. It was not our mission at the time’”.
48
 While members of 
the Bush administration, such as Rumsfeld and Garner, asserted that the looting had occurred 
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before Coalition boots hit the ground in Iraq, the After Action Report of the 3
rd
 Infantry Division 
claimed otherwise. The looting was right in front of them, yet they allowed it to resume largely 
unchallenged because of the strategic policies implemented by the DoD. After all, the mission 
was not to secure the population and provide stability, but rather it was to topple Saddam’s 
regime as quickly as possible.
49
  
 As U.S. and Coalition forces were forced to stand idle during the anarchy, the Bush 
administration’s previous efforts to preserve Iraqi cultural sites and administrative buildings 
were rendered useless. The DoD had done a fair amount of research into what they deemed to be 
legitimate targets. Through this screening process, the military had come up with a sizeable list 
of museums, shrines, mosques, and government buildings that were to remain unscathed. Indeed, 
U.S. and Coalition air campaigns kept true to their words and used precision bombing to leave all 
of the designated sites on the list untouched. However, in the absence of direct orders to have 
boots secure those sites, the looting destroyed them.
50
 Good faith efforts of the Bush 
administration did not achieve their desired goal of protecting those sites because of larger 
strategic errors.  
 The looting that swallowed Iraq did a great deal of damage to elements of Iraqi society 
that were to be crucial cogs of the quick reconstruction process. Much of the bureaucratic 
infrastructure that the Bush administration had so heavily relied on to stay intact was immensely 
damaged. Administrative buildings were rendered worthless when they were ransacked dry of 
desks, official records, electrical schemes, windowpanes, and roofing. The only thing left 
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standing in many buildings was the structural frame.
51
 Colonel Joseph Cramer remembers the 
looting’s massive destruction and how it fundamentally thwarted reconstruction efforts,  
You’d see all these buildings that must’ve been, had to have been corrugated steel…you’d see 
whole towns of frames because the people had come in and stole all of the corrugated steel off of 
them. There was no wire ever…like electrical wire. It was all stolen, in one week…gone. But it 
was survival. That wasn’t the Americans, but that was still destruction…that was still 
infrastructure that had to be replaced and caused chaos. It was definitely one step [forward], two 
steps back.52  
Baghdad and nearly all of Iraq’s other major cities had essentially lost all administrative and 
logistical capabilities. Of the twenty-three major ministry buildings in Baghdad, seventeen were 
completely destroyed by the looting. It is worth noting that the administration had planned to use 
most of the ministry buildings so that civilian staffs could implement reconstruction policies 
swiftly.
53
 The looting caused an estimated $12 billion in damages to Iraq’s economic, 
communication, and administrative infrastructure. Massive repairs were required just to get 
Iraq’s infrastructure back to pre-war levels, which were already in shambles to say the least.
54
  
The administration’s lack of response to the looting greatly hindered its abilities to 
quickly restore order to Iraq as the plan had called for. As Iraq was robbed of its physical 
capabilities to run and govern itself, the burden of reconstructing the nation fell entirely on U.S. 
and Coalition forces instead of the Iraqis as originally planned. In doing so, the administration 
ironically set itself up to be obligated to take over a situation, which it had purposefully rendered 
itself incapable of doing.  
 The psychological effect of the looting and lawlessness on the Iraqi population was 
perhaps the greatest repercussion of the anarchy. Iraqis were baffled by the sight of such 
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lawlessness. They could not understand how a nation with such grandeur, wealth, and physical 
power could allow for crime and looting to occur throughout Iraq on such a large-scale. Most 
Iraqis were in utter shock to say the least when it took U.S. and Coalition troops simply three 
weeks to topple the tyrant, whom they had learned to perceive as invincible over the past thirty 
years. Now, many wondered how a nation could do the latter and then seem helpless in 
preventing the lawlessness.
55
 The two did not add up for the demographic of Iraqis that had been 
hopeful for a new Iraq. Ali al-Shaheen, a native of Baghdad, recalls the disbelief shared by so 
many Iraqis,  
The looters came like ants. They started ransacking houses near us, in sight of the Americans. 
There was a tank at either end of the main road in our neighborhood…The Americans were just 
sitting in the tanks overlooking this for days but never coming out. I went with some neighbors of 
mine who also speak English to try and talk to them. They shooed us away without speaking. So, 
we were left on our own…56 
The anarchical state of Iraq greatly tarnished the American image among most Iraqis. The fact 
that it went on largely unchallenged for nearly six weeks after the fall of Saddam amplified this 
sour taste.
57
 Colonel Terence Daly puts it in simpler terms, “I was horrified when I saw the 
looting and the American inaction afterward. If I were an Iraqi, it would have shown me that 
these people are not serious.”
58
 While the Bush administration had claimed that U.S. and 
Coalition troops would march into Iraq as liberators, they did not appear that way to the many 
Iraqis who experienced the brunt of the post-invasion chaos.  
 Although the looting was mostly conducted by Iraqis themselves, the majority of Iraqis 
placed the blame on U.S. and Coalition efforts. If they were to storm into Iraq and remove the 
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centralized authority, then it was their responsibility to quickly restore governance so chaos and 
looting would not ensue.
59
 Shadid explains the root of Iraqi discontent,  
While the Americans were not fully responsible [for the looting], Iraqis perceived them as 
allowing the plunder and pondered whether the condition of their country was the result of 
malicious inattention or inattentive malice.60 
Iraqi resentment, thus, was founded on the observation of perceived carelessness. L. Paul 
Bremer, the director of the Coalition Provisional Authority, was correct in his reflections of the 
looting, “We paid a big price for not stopping [the looting] because it established an atmosphere 
of lawlessness”.
61
 Most U.S. and Coalition troops had no intention of purposefully harming 
Iraqis or allowing anarchy to unravel. In fact, quite the opposite was true. Yet, without direct 
orders to intervene in the looting, Iraqis did not understanf their intentions. Instead, Iraqis began 
to adopt a view opposite to what U.S. and Coalition troops hoped to project. 
 Indeed, the flaws of the administration’s strategic thinking were highlighted in the early 
aftermath of post-Saddam Iraq. The near absence of planning for Phase IV came back to haunt 
the administration as the civilian institutions sent to reconstruct Iraq were quickly overwhelmed 
by unforeseen phenomenon such as looting and infrastructural damage. In hindsight, ORHA and 
its failure to stabilize the situation in Iraq provides one with an example of all the problems with 
the administration’s strategic thinking.  
Although ORHA’s purpose was to provide basic services until the transfer of power, Jay 
Garner and the rest of his team were incapable of handling the post-invasion pandemonium. 
Caught off guard, ORHA did not have anywhere near the required levels of staffing or funding to 
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 As a result, Iraq remained in disorder even after the looting had ended. 
Iraqis, suffering from a lack of basic services and authority in the streets, looked to ORHA for 
immediate solutions. Yet, Garner had none, and thus, frustration soon turned into hopelessness. 
Ayad Allawi, the future Interim Prime Minister, explained further at a conference with Garner in 
the spring of 2003, 
…we were euphoric…we were going to have a real democracy with rule of law, a country worthy 
of its citizens…The looting was heartbreaking…Jay Garner and other senior American officials 
had been holding a series of meetings with various opposition figures like us…and he opened the 
meeting by saying he had called us in to get our views on how to set up a new government in Iraq. 
Frankly, I was shocked…They had no plan. None. Here was the United States of America, the 
only super power in the world. And their leading decision makers on Iraq had no idea what to 
do?63 
As the official, and virtually only, authority figure, ORHA was the face of U.S. and Coalition 
efforts in Iraq. Its inability to stabilize Iraq in the anarchical aftermath of the invasion gave a 
damaging first impression of incompetence and arrogance to Iraqis. ORHA’s inherent 
powerlessness to stop the looting and restore public order allowed for the initial tarnish of the 
American image to become ever darker.  
ORHA’s infectiveness in stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq was exacerbated by its lack of 
communication with the Iraqi population. Iraqis remained uninformed of any U.S. efforts to stop 
the looting while they watched stolen televisions and desks go by. Consequently, resentment 
began to brew.
64
 Although Garner hosted several conferences with prominent sheikhs and 
politicians to promote dialogue between the U.S. and Iraqis, they largely went to no avail. The 
purpose of the Baghdad Conferences, as these meetings came to be known, was to understand 
the sort of humanitarian effort the people needed. Yet, Garner usually held these meetings with a 
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vague speech and a very limited Q & A. His conferences never provided Iraqis with any detail as 
to how ORHA would specifically change the situation in localities. As a result, sheikhs and 
politicians repeatedly left these meetings feeling unheard and on their own.
65
 A post from 
Riverbend, a Baghdadi blogger, from September 29, 2003 recalls these events and how poorly 
they were run,  
Shortly after the occupation, Jay Garner began meeting with the prominent members of Iraqi 
society…The sheikhs were important because each sheikh basically had influence over hundreds, 
if not thousands of ‘family’…Almost every single sheikh had his own woeful story to tell. They 
were angry and annoyed. And these weren’t people who loved Saddam. Many of them hated the 
former regime…The whole group, in a storm of indignation and helplessness, rose to leave the 
meeting…When one of the prominent sheikhs was asked how the meeting went, he angrily said 
that it wasn’t a conference-they had gathered up the sheikhs to ‘give them orders’ without a 
willingness to listen to the other side of the story…66  
The Baghdad Conferences were unsuccessful because Garner and ORHA led them as vague 
lectures rather than back-and-forth dialogue with important members of Iraqi society. As a result, 
Iraq’s voice went unheard. Tragically, even if Garner had engaged the sheikhs and actively 
sought to address their issues, ORHA most likely would have lacked the means to do so. 
Regardless, ORHA’s lack of outreach further solidified the growing trend of Iraqis seeing their 
liberators more and more as occupiers. 
Furthermore, ORHA lacked a basic strategy for accomplishing its limited scope of 
humanitarian goals as well. Garner had arrived in Baghdad with no protocol or strategic 
understanding to direct his team on how to accomplish their assigned tasks. Although Douglas 
Feith had conducted a minimal amount of postwar planning in the fall of 2002 for assistance to 
the Iraqi population, Garner had not seen any of the work. Garner had not even heard about 
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Feith’s plans until ten days after he arrived in Baghdad.
67
 Rumsfeld and other members of the 
administration repeatedly advised Garner to devise his own plan for how ORHA would achieve 
its objectives. The issue with the DoD’s advice, however, is best explained by Garner himself, 
“This is an ad hoc operation, glued together over about four or five weeks’ time. [We] didn’t 
really have enough time to plan.”
68
 After all, ORHA had been established on January 21, 2003, a 
mere two months before the invasion. Garner simply did not have the regional expertise and time 
to conduct thorough planning for his objectives in Iraq.
69
  
Garner repeatedly attempted to gain regional expertise from the State Department in 
order to assist ORHA with implementing humanitarian assistance; however, his attempts were 
repeatedly shut down by the DoD. Feith had vetoed every single State Department regional 
expert that Garner had nominated for ORHA’s Civil Administrator position. Instead, Feith 
nominated Michael Mobbs for the job, a DoD official who lacked any relatable experience to 
administrative planning and had virtually no cultural knowledge of Iraq.
70
 Mobbs’s 
incompetence for the position is best exemplified in his work at ORHA. While working as the 
Civil Administrator in Iraq, Mobbs had devised detailed plans for protecting the oil fields, yet 
planned virtually nothing on how to restore services.
71
  
Garner’s attempt to create a solid team of translators was also thwarted by Rumsfeld and 
Feith. Garner had arrived in Baghdad with four translators when he was initially estimated to 
require approximately two-hundred. The four he had were Arab-American career officials who 
were among the best the State Department had to offer. Yet, Rumsfeld and Feith strongly 
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advised Garner to remove them all in lieu of DoD translators that they trusted more with the 
Bush administration’s policies.
72
 In their strident efforts to monopolize U.S. policies in Iraq, 
Rumsfeld, Feith, and the rest of the DoD had cut Garner short of the skill he desperately needed 
for ORHA’s nearly impossible task. The DoD’s adherence to its own ideological approach to 
Iraq seemed to take precedent over implementing the actual skills and expertise necessary to 
execute ORHA’s objectives.  
The Bush administration’s dismissal of the State Department research initiative The 
Future of Iraq Project is perhaps the best example of denied assets to ORHA.
73
 The Future of 
Iraq Project was a research committee created by the State Department to develop viable 
predictions of what post-invasion Iraq would look like, what Coalition forces would need to do 
to restore order, and what factors Coalition forces would need to focus on in order to solidify 
public support quickly. Beginning in October of 2001, it was the earliest and most 
comprehensive pre-war planning effort for post-war Iraq.
74
 The committee was comprised of 
Iraqi exiles and refugees, State Department regional experts, academic scholars on Iraq, and 
other officials. Ultimately, they used their $5 million grant to produce a 2,500 page advisory 
document to serve as a foundation for swift and effective post-war procedures.
75
 It was by far the 
most developed strategic road map available for how to achieve the Bush administration’s goals 
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in Iraq during Phase IV. Yet Rumsfeld, Feith, and Wolfowitz deeply distrusted the State 
Department initiative. All three thought that the State Department was determined to debunk the 
administration’s efforts in Iraq and that The Future of Iraq Project was ammunition for anti-war 
doves.
76
 Aware of the difficulties the Bush administration may have had for rallying public and 
Congressional support behind the war, the DoD pushed the project aside and denied its content to 
war planners.  
Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Feith never mentioned the project’s research to Garner and his 
team at ORHA. Garner had not heard about The Future of Iraq Project until late February of 
2003. Upon coming across the research initiative, Garner tried to incorporate its findings and 
guidance as much as possible into ORHA. However, Tim Garney, an ORHA official appointed 
by Wolfowitz, recalled that Garner was “instructed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to 
ignore The Future of Iraq Project” because he asserted that the State Department was attempting 
to take over reconstruction efforts.
77
 Garner even attempted to bring Tom Warrick, the leader of 
The Future of Iraq Project, into ORHA to assist him in developing a post-war plan. The 
interaction between Rumsfeld and Garner that followed this attempt demonstrates the 
administration’s prioritization of monopolizing the war effort, “Jay, have you got a guy named 
Warrick on your Team?...This came to me from such a high level that I can’t overturn it, and I’ve 
just got to ask you to remove Mr. Warrick.”
78
 Rumsfeld saw the project as an effort to thwart the 
administration’s in-and-out doctrine and implement a prolonged occupation instead. Thus, the 
Bush administration effectively shut out all possible strategic thinking with regards to Iraq. In 
hindsight, ORHA’s mishaps in the early occupation and reconstruction of Iraq seem inevitable. 
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Yet, the situation in Iraq and the tarnished image of U.S. efforts were greatly exacerbated by 
what followed ORHA and the early occupation. 
 By late April of 2003, the Bush administration had decided to replace ORHA with the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), an institution more fit to carry out reconstruction in Iraq. 
The CPA officially assumed authority in Iraq on May 12, 2003 when its director, Ambassador L. 
Paul Bremer, landed in Baghdad.
79
 The establishment of the CPA, however, marked the 
formalization of the U.S. occupation.  
The quick transfer of power that the administration hoped for, rested on the expectation 
that the Iraqi exiled advisors, led by Ahmad Chalabi, would be able to form a legitimate 
government immediately following Saddam’s removal.
80
 The DoD sent Chalabi and 
approximately seven-hundred other exiles to Iraq to do just that as soon the invasion began. Yet, 
Chalabi and his followers proved to be much less popular among Iraqis than the administration 
had hoped. Chalabi and the rest could not muster the necessary support to create a transitional 
authority.
81
 Bremer’s advisors later explained the administration’s disappointment, “We gave 
them [Chalabi and his followers] a chance. We bankrolled some of them. But they just couldn’t 
get their act together. It was amateur hour.”
82
 The foundation for a quick withdrawal had 
crumbled beneath the Bush administration when the exiles proved to be ineffective. With no 
clear and viable option for a transitional government, the Bush administration decided that the 
CPA was in Iraq for the long haul. This did not bode well for Iraqi support. 
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Iraqis began to feel differently about their liberators as U.S. reconstruction efforts 
increasingly resembled foreign rule – a far too familiar demon from their nation’s past.  The 
CPA’s assertion that it would remain indefinitely in power until authority could feasibly be 
transferred to an interim government established an image of U.S. dominion in Iraq.
83
 Bremer 
insisted on holding the reins of authority in Iraq until a constitution could be drafted and 
elections held. Although he had appointed an advisory council, known as the Iraqi Governing 
Council (IGC), to assist him in drafting elections, Iraqis viewed the IGC to be illegitimate.
84
 
Thus, as the weeks rolled by and Iraqis had no voice in the reconstruction of their nation besides 
that of an illegitimate council with only advisory capabilities, they began to see their liberators 
more as an occupying force. While Riverbend’s blog posts began in the summer of 2003, her 
comments arise from the sentiment that began to flourish in Iraq during the CPA’s early days in 
the spring, “Call it whatever you want – to me it’s an occupation.”
85
 Although U.S. and Coalition 
forces had freed the nation from a dictator, they began to overstay their welcome as the situation 
remained unstable and the United States increasingly appeared to be yet another tyrant in 
Saddam’s place.  
Iraqi sentiment plummeted with the CPA’s official recognition of itself as an occupying 
power. The formal occupation of Iraq by the CPA was declared on May 22, 2003.
86
 Much of the 
Iraqi outrage spurred from Bremer’s use of the word occupation itself. Mohammad Hayawi, an 
Iraqi civilian, explains further,  
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Before the war, they said they wanted to help the Iraqi people. They wanted to rid us of a great 
dictatorship. They didn’t come as an occupier…We won’t accept them as occupiers…The word 
‘occupation’ is a huge word…The Americans shouldn’t use this word.87 
Although many Iraqis displayed exuberance over the removal of Saddam, they simultaneously 
feared a foreign occupation. While Bremer may have had the reconstruction of post-WWII 
Europe in mind when he described the CPA as an occupying authority, Iraqis know the term only 
by a negative connotation, forged in their history with Western imperialism. Naturally, Iraqis felt 
a deep hostility towards the notion of the word.
88
 
Although Bremer’s declaration was merely the official recognition of the realities in Iraq 
since the removal of Saddam, Iraqis were extremely sensitive towards this declaration. The 
Arabic word for occupation, ihtilal, is commonly used to describe the Arab struggle in Palestine 
against Israel as well as the decades of colonial rule in the Middle-East following WWI.
89
 It 
reminds Arabs of their oppressive history in the face of superior foreign powers. Shadid goes 
further to describe the immense repercussions of word choice,  
By definition, ihtilal denotes inequality, a relationship of two unequal powers, the weaker 
submitting to the will of the stronger. By imposing the occupation, the Americans declared that the 
situation was different from what most Iraqis perceived it to be…90 
Clearly, to many Iraqis the word occupation does not mean the temporary seizure of sovereignty 
by a foreign power for the purposes of a nation’s reconstruction. Rather, it is a repetition of a 
history of domination and national embarrassment. This was a part of Iraqi history that many 
wanted to have kept in the past. Yet, the formal occupation of the CPA suggested that Iraq’s past 
was coming back to haunt them once more. 
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 By late spring, the situation in Iraq that the CPA had inherited was grim at best. Yet 
Bremer led the CPA into making fatal policy decisions early in its establishment. These policies 
ultimately exacerbated waning public support, and thus, greatly contributed to the growing 
destabilization. The first of the CPA’s drastic and consequential choices came only days after 
Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad. CPA Order No. 1, commonly known as de-Ba’athification, was 
issued on May 16, 2003. This decree removed all senior Ba’ath party members from public 
office and barred them from any future government employment.
91
 Bremer’s definition of what it 
meant to be a senior Ba’ath party member, however, made the decree much more damaging to 
reconstruction efforts than beneficial. Of the six tiers of membership within the Ba’ath party, 
CPA Order No. 1 affected all but the bottom two. An estimated 85,000 Iraqis lost their jobs.
92
 
Iraqis could apply and appeal for an exemption from the blanket policy; however, doing so was 
much easier said than done.  
In order to be exempt, Iraqis had to fill out an application, find their way through the 
dense foreign bureaucracy, and then make their case directly in front of Bremer himself. Of the 
85,000 newly unemployed Iraqis, approximately 9,000 were able to apply for and receive 
exemptions due to the immensely strenuous process.
93
 Riverbend explains Iraqi discontent,  
The first place it [de-Ba’athification] began in was the universities. Any Ba’athist with 
administrative positions, were asked to step down…any Ba’athist professors should be made to 
quit. That was too much…Things were already tough before the war, this would make things 
impossible.94 
Bremer’s intentions of removing government corruption and preventing ex-Saddam loyalists 
from gaining power again was indeed well-spirited, yet it failed to accomplish its strategic aim of 
gaining the support of the population. Aside from angering and alienating thousands of affected 
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Iraqis and their families, Bremer’s first decree simultaneously destroyed the bureaucratic 
capabilities of Iraq to manage what was left of the nation’s less-than-functional administrative 
infrastructure.   
 CPA Order No. 1 caused great long-term damages to the CPA’s reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq. Bremer’s policy removed thousands of qualified and experienced workers from Iraq’s 
professional sector. In a socialist society in which virtually all public service employment and 
professional promotions required party membership, the effects of de-Ba’athification were 
devastating. Thousands of teachers, doctors, university professors, engineers, and other public 
service employees were laid off.
95
 Bremer had sent home thousands of professionals that the 
Bush administration had originally expected to stay on the job for quick reconstruction.  
It is evident how the Bush administration’s lack of strategic guidance to its assets in Iraq 
ultimately hindered their efforts to achieve their political goals as people like Garner and Bremer 
were left astray with no direction. Tomislav Z. Ruby, an Air Force advisor, explains further,  
…no matter how strong the leadership within the Coalition was, and no matter how precisely 
national leaders knew what they wanted, military commanders, intergovernmental planners, 
Coalition partners, and Iraqis did not have a written, agreed-upon common objective.96 
In the absence of a centralized political strategy to refer to, Bremer made a drastic decision, 
which had great repercussions for the entire U.S. operation. The burden of restoring public order 
and civil services now rested completely on the back of the immensely underfunded and 
understaffed CPA. Bremer began the road to a prolonged U.S. occupation, the dilemma that the 
administration had previously hoped to prevent. 
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Weeks later, Bremer destabilized Iraq further by issuing CPA Order No. 2 on May 23, 
2003. CPA Order No. 2 disbanded all branches of the Iraqi army and militias in hopes to rid Iraq 
of the institution that Saddam previously used to oppress the Iraqi people.
97
 Yet in doing so, 
Bremer left approximately 385,000 soldiers, many of whom were conscripts, without the jobs 
they desperately relied on to support their families. Furthermore, Order No. 2 also dissolved the 
Ministry of the Interior, which, laid off approximately 285,000 Iraqis, many of whom were 
police and security forces.
98
 Riverbend explains the grave repercussions of Bremer’s decision 
through her observations of laid off soldiers during the summer of 2003, 
Over 65% of the Iraqi population is unemployed. The reason for this is because Bremer made 
some horrible decisions. The first major decision…was to dissolve the Iraqi army. That may make 
sense in Washington, but here, we were left speechless. Now there are over 400,000 trained, 
armed men with families that need to be fed. Where are they supposed to go? What are they 
supposed to do for a living? I don’t know. They certainly don’t know. They roam the street 
looking for work, looking for an answer. You can see perplexity and anger in their stance, their 
walk, their whole demeanor.99 
 Order No. 2 alienated a substantial portion of the Iraqi population. Studies in 2005 estimated 
that disbanding the Iraqi Army and Ministry of the Interior directly affected approximately 2.4 
million Iraqis, or 10% of the entire population.
100
 With no native security forces and thousands 
of jobless, aggravated young men in the streets, the situation in Iraq came to a very critical 
tipping point. If Iraqis previously felt hopeless, Order No. 2 amplified and transformed their 
sentiments into raging bitterness. 
Bremer had clarified that pensions would be paid along with a termination fee of twenty 
U.S. dollars. However, all ranks above colonel were considered to be senior Ba’ath party 
members and were denied payment of any sort. Furthermore, the CPA had immense difficulties 
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in distributing the pensions to all those that qualified. As a result, much of the rank and file did 
not receive their pensions.
101
 Khairi Jassim, an officer in the Iraqi army commented on Order No. 
2 with outrage and haunting foreboding, “All of us will become suicide bombers…”
102
 Another 
former Iraqi officer supported the Jassim’s claim, “The only thing left for me is to blow myself 
up in the face of tyrants.”
103
 Iraqi resentment began to immediately spike as young men remained 
jobless and families scraped by without their main source of income. CPA Order No. 2 enraged a 
substantial portion of the Iraqi community, many of which were passionate young men with few 
opportunities and extensive military training – the exact demographic that a guerrilla recruiter 
would look to infiltrate when forming an insurgency.
104
 
Unfortunately, the potential for disgruntled veterans to be drafted into the insurgency 
became an observable reality later in 2003 when militia recruiters saw the vast potential in Iraq’s 
unemployed soldiers. Fanatical religious militias as well as political paramilitary organizations 
began offering these men jobs to fight U.S. and Coalition forces in exchange for income. 
Riverbend recalls this development in her blog post from December of 2003,  
Islamic parties supported by Iran…are currently recruiting followers by offering ‘wages’ to jobless 
men (an ex-soldier in the army, for example) in trade of ‘support’. This support could mean 
anything – vote when the elections come around, bomb a specific shop, ‘confiscate’, abduct, 
hijack cars…105  
                                               
101 Mowle, Hope Is Not A Plan, 27. Also see Phillips, Losing Iraq, 149-150. Also see Riverbend, Baghdad Burning, 
122. 
102
 Ricks, Fiasco, 165. 
103 Ibid., 165. Major Saad Omri also demonstrated strong resentment and warning of what the Iraqi military would 
do if they did not immediately get their jobs back in an interview with Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “We don’t want to be 
treated this way…if the Americans don’t change this policy, there will be trouble. The Iraqis will not tolerate this” 
(Chandrasekaran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, 76). 
104 Shadid, Night Draws Near, 181.  
105 Riverbend, Baghdad Burning, 20. 
36 
 
Furthermore, while resentment was rampant, many ex-soldiers began joining armed forces not 
out of political or religious ideology, but rather, out of desperation for work. Shadid’s encounter 
with several Iraqi veterans who joined various militias elaborates further,  
‘We have children, we have families, and we need to live’…From a family of ten, Yusuf had two 
daughters, aged three and four, and two sons, aged two and five. ‘We don’t love the Americans, 
but we need the money,’ he said. ‘It’s very difficult, but there’s no other alternative.’ Awad 
nodded his head in agreement. ‘There’s no work. Otherwise we have to steal. You have to become 
an Ali Baba [American and Iraqi slang for an insurgent]’.106 
It did not take long for U.S. and Coalition forces to feel the brunt of the repercussions of Order 
No. 2 as the CPA’s policy created an atmosphere of hopelessness. Even if men did not want to 
fight the occupation or support religious fundamentalist terror campaigns, their financial 
situations often left them with no other choice. In failing to provide this demographic of Iraqis 
with opportunity and stability, as they had promised, the CPA created a new class of enemies.  
 Aside from being a disaster, CPA Order No. 2 was also an enormous miscalculation of 
the realities at hand in Iraq. Upon invasion, most Iraqi servicemen dropped their uniforms and 
weapons and fell in with the population. Bremer insisted that the Iraqi military had disbanded 
itself and that he was simply making the developments official.
107
 Yet, Paul Hughes, an Army 
Colonel who worked for ORHA claimed that Iraqi military officers had repeatedly approached 
him in the early occupation for clearance to reform their units and contribute to the 
reconstruction effort.
108
 Mustafa Duleimi, an Iraqi Lieutenant Colonel, supported Hughes’s claim 
in an interview with Rajiv Chandrasekaran days after Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad, “We’re 
waiting for our orders…We are ready to help our country…The army was formed long before 
Saddam became president. We are loyal not to one man, but to our country.”
109
 Colonel Baha’a 
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Nouri Yasseen also provides evidence for yet another unit willing to participate in 
reconstruction,  
The real military men like me didn’t care whether the army was under the control of Saddam or 
whoever. We were the army of Iraq, a professional army for the country. Many of us wanted to 
continue working for the country regardless of the political changes. We had the same mentality as 
most other good armies of the world. We served the state, not individual rulers.110 
Although the Iraqi military was absent due to U.S. military presence, substantial amounts of the 
385,000 men in uniform were still willing to continue their service through aiding U.S. efforts. 
Bremer failed to understand the goodwill of many Iraqi commanders. In doing so, he overlooked 
the potentiality of a valuable asset in the Iraqi military to immediately aid the sparse U.S. and 
Coalition troops with their massive security responsibilities.  
 Bremer seemed to have realized the vast consequences of Order No. 2 shortly after its 
implementation. The Bush administration and CENTCOM had always envisioned using 
elements of the Iraqi army to assist in the swift establishment and maintenance of security in 
post-Saddam Iraq. Bremer issued another CPA order in which he invited non-Ba’athist officers 
to return and be screened for possible reinstating of their positions in the new Iraqi army.
111
 Yet, 
the damage had already been done through ensuring a society of strong male pride that they were 
losers, and that their passion to serve their country would be denied.
112
 An interaction between 
journalist Rajiv Chandrasekaran and a former Iraqi soldier weeks after Bremer’s reinstating order 
had been issued demonstrates the irreversible effects of Order No. 2, “‘What happened to 
everyone [former soldiers]?’ I asked. ‘Did they join the new army?’ He laughed, ‘They’re all 
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insurgents now,’ he said. ‘Bremer lost his chance.’”
113
 Army Colonel Alan King with the 3
rd
 
Infantry Division remembers the immediate effects of Order No. 2 as well,  
When Bremer did that, the insurgency went crazy. May was the turning point for the U.S. 
occupation…When they disbanded the military…that was it. Every moderate, every person that 
had leaned toward us, was furious. One Iraqi who had saved my life in an ambush said to me, ‘I 
can’t be your friend anymore.’114 
Although Bremer attempted to make amends, the CPA clearly lost its opportunity to win the 
support of a substantial portion of the population. The Iraqi army could have been used to 
maintain security and allow U.S. and Coalition troops to be sent home, thus, adhering to the 
administration’s in-and-out doctrine. There could have been several different ways for the 
administration to go about dealing with the Iraqi army, all of which would have had the potential 
of yielding positive results. In failing to use the Iraqi army as it stood at all, the administration 
allowed it to indefinitely serve as one of the pillars of the developing Iraqi insurgency.  
How Iraqis Came to See the U.S. Occupation as an Enemy 
 By early 2004, the crucial question had been decided. Iraqis lost hope in the occupation 
and concluded across the board that they had come to their country not as liberators, but as 
occupiers. Basic living conditions were abysmal and walking the streets of Iraq was becoming a 
death sentence in itself. Consequently, Iraqi morale plummeted into disillusionment as any hopes 
for a better life without Saddam were met with quite the opposite. Abdul Wahab Fuad, a civilian 
who lost his legs due to an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) was one of many Iraqis who was 
met with a rude awakening:  
…I was thinking it would be a good thing if the Americans came before the invasion. We saw the 
countries following American policies, like the Perisan Gulf states, and they all were living a 
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good, prosperous life. Even countries like Jordan. We expected to see the same thing happen to us, 
a better life. What can I say? I thought it would be something different.115 
Wamidh Nadhme also explains why Iraqis concluded that the Americans were, indeed, occupiers 
instead of liberators,  
They promised they would bring democracy and liberation to Iraq. Where is the democracy and 
liberation? We have seen looting, we have seen the burning of hospitals, we have seen the robbery 
of the central bank. The Americans, up until now, have failed to win the support of educated, 
respected, credible people.116 
Any Iraqi who previously supported the U.S. invasion or remained open to supporting it now 
found themselves staunchly and aggressively opposed to it. Within this environment of 
discontent, insurgents and all others willing to take arms against the occupation were not 
perceived to be firebrands, but rather, freedom fighters. In viewing the United States as occupiers 
rather than liberators, Iraqis felt that they were left with no other option but armed resistance. 
Therefore, in failing to secure Iraqi support, the key issue at stake during post-Saddam 
operations, the Bush administration made enemies out of an entire nation.  
The aforementioned sentiment created utter instability, rendering the achievement of the 
Bush administration’s goals impossible. Without a stable social sphere, Iraq could not be the ally 
the Bush administration needed, let alone the beacon of light in the Middle East. Furthermore, 
instability created the perfect atmosphere to highlight and amplify sectarian divisions to hostile 
levels. Without a strong nation to tie all sects together, a resurgence of fundamentalism 
developed as Iraqis began to re-identify with their different sectarian groups in the wake of 
desperation and fear. Therefore, in failing to stabilize Iraq, the Bush administration allowed for 
the foundation for a civil war to develop as well. By 2004, Iraq was well on its way to the chaos 
that was to explode in 2006.  
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 The U.S. occupation greatly alienated Iraqis over time through its inabilities to provide a 
constant flow of utilities and basic services. The U.S. struggled to provide Iraqis with water, 
electricity, and sewage from the onset of the occupation. The city of Wasit, for example, had 
virtually no sewage services between 2003 and 2006. As a result, three-fourths of the city’s 
sewage laid openly in the channel that flowed into the Tigris. There was a shortage in almost 
every utility and most services such as electricity were rationed. Necessities such as cooking oil 
and gas were also in extremely short supply in a country laden with oil because the CPA could 
not bring the oil refineries back to necessary production levels to meet the demands of Iraqis.
117
 
Staff Sergeant Mike Brase recalls the inability of the occupation to provide adequate living 
services as late as 2005,  
You got a major city, like one of the largest in the world is Baghdad, and you would have sections 
of the city that would be completely blacked out due to lack of power. One part of the city would 
have it on while another part of the city would have it off, and then they would have to switch 
cause the power grids were so screwed up… There was raw sewage for instance that would be 
covering a road way…There would be some major neighborhoods with nothing but raw sewage in 
the streets. Simple things like garbage services and trash services. A trash plan for removing the 
trash out of cities wasn’t in place until towards the end of my tour. I mean, I’m thinking to myself, 
‘we’re half way through 2005 and they still don’t have a trash service going?’…it was 
ridiculous…118 
The CPA struggled to keep up with the demands of major cities such as Baghdad, and struggled 
even more to provide a nation as large as California with proper utilities. It was a job for a highly 
efficient bureaucracy with a great deal of staffing and proper funding – everything the CPA was 
not. As a result, people that were used to living under a dictator who was able to provide them 
with adequate services on a consistent basis were met with a rude awakening.
119
  
While pre-war expectations asserted that Iraq’s infrastructure would remain functional, 
the Bush administration failed to grasp the realities behind Saddam’s façade. Although Saddam 
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had been very effective at delivering basic service such as electricity, water, sewage, and trash 
services to major metropolitan areas, Iraq’s infrastructure as a whole was in shambles.
120
 Just 
prior to the invasion, 70% of Iraq’s sewage plants needed major repairs and 80% of the electrical 
grid was working at half its capacity.
121
 Shadid puts it bluntly, “The Americans had failed to 
account for the state of Iraq’s infrastructure, aged, decrepit, and worn down as it was by more 
than a decade of sanctions.”
122
 Indeed, while Saddam had been successful in providing major 
cities with services, he was doing so with a system bound to collapse under its own weight at any 
moment.  
Although it is extremely difficult for intelligence to assess the conditions of a hostile 
country’s infrastructure, proper planning for Phase IV could have potentially provided the Bush 
administration with viable options to address the unexpectedly decrepit infrastructure in a timely 
manner. Moreover, the state of Iraq’s infrastructure can be expected for a nation that has 
experienced decades of warfare and harsh economic sanctions. Yet, the Bush administration 
seemed to overlook this fact when they predicted a quick restoration of utilities and basic 
services. 
The issues the U.S. occupation inherited were exacerbated when the repercussions of 
earlier developments such as looting and de-Ba’athification settled in. The administration had 
previously seen Iraq’s oil fields to be the key to financing the nation’s own reconstruction; 
therefore, U.S. and Coalition troops guarded them vigorously. However, in doing so, other 
aspects of Iraq’s infrastructure such as water treatment plants and electrical power plants were 
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overlooked and largely unguarded.
123
 Iraq’s subpar infrastructure was damaged by the looting 
and lawlessness to the point in which it was essentially useless. The electrical grid alone had 
been so heavily damaged by the looting that its power supply was reduced to one-fifth that of 
pre-war levels.
124
 The CPA had to spend massive amounts of money and resources to just to 
bring Iraq’s infrastructure functionality back to lousy pre-war levels.
125
  
Moreover, de-Ba’athification had left Iraq’s heavily damaged and inadequate 
infrastructure with minimal numbers of workers to manage it. Saddam’s jimmy-rigged grids and 
plants now had a lack of expertise on how to run them. The CIA station chief in Iraq put things 
into perspective in his response to CPA Order No. 1, “These are the people who know where the 
levers of the infrastructure are, from electricity to water to transportation…Take them out of the 
equation and you undercut the operation of this country…”
126
 The Bush administration’s early 
decision making had long-term repercussions for the occupation. With no conceptual 
understanding of how to compensate for heavily damaged infrastructure and minimal 
administrative capabilities, the CPA was a deer in the headlights. It quickly found itself in a 
serious predicament with practically no option on hand to react in a timely manner.  
The CPA’s efforts to restore services were ultimately unsuccessful. The 2004 fiscal year 
allocated $18.4 billion to the CPA for funding infrastructure projects in Iraq. This program, 
known as 2207, largely focused on large infrastructure projects to provide Iraq with a stable 
foundation for new and modernized power, water treatment, and sewage plants. Although Iraq 
needed long-term projects like this, the people would not see their benefits until decades later. 
The CPA did not realize that it needed to focus on small-scale distribution projects 
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simultaneously so that the Iraqi population could immediately feel the effects of U.S. goodwill to 
restore services. Big sewage plants were now capable of treating much more waste than before; 
yet, Iraq’s cities still had no garbage collection services. Gigantic water treatment plants were 
being restored, yet, they still lacked the means to distribute clean water. It was not until late 2004 
when Major General Chiarelli of the 1
st
 Cavalry Division made successful attempts to reallocate 
2207’s funding to distribution projects.
127
 Unfortunately, Chiarelli’s work may have come too 
late. By late 2004, Iraqis had been scraping by without proper services in the heat of the desert 
for more than a year and a half. By the time 2207 could begin its distribution projects, antipathy 
had already established itself well within the masses.  
To make matters worse, the Bush administration’s efforts to restore Iraq’s infrastructure 
went largely unnoticed by the Iraqi people. Major infrastructure projects began early in the 
occupation; however, most of these projects were nowhere near the major metropolitan areas. 
Most of Iraq’s main power plants are located in unpopulated areas outside of the major cities. 
Furthermore, most of the basic materials required for these projects had to be shipped in from 
neighboring countries because Iraq could not supply them on its own. As a result, all of the work 
being done was out of sight for the average Iraqi. Iraqis could not physically observe U.S. efforts 
to restore the infrastructure, and the material being shipped in was assumed to be for the 
American occupation. Therefore, Iraqis largely concluded that no work was being done at all.
128
 
The administration’s lack of communication and absence of outreach clearly hindered their 
efforts. Without an active effort to report the truth to the population, Iraqis believed what they 
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saw in front of them.
129
 While the administration assured Iraqis that work was being done, Iraqis 
wanted proof. After all, despite the administration’s claims, Iraqis were not seeing any results.  
The Bush administration’s efforts to restore basic services also proved to be 
counterproductive. Early on, the CPA was determined to bolster the American image through 
appearing to be better for Iraq than Saddam’s regime. They intended to do this through providing 
electricity and water services to all Iraqis throughout the nation. Previously, Saddam had left 
many rural areas of Shiite Iraq without electricity or other services. Rather, he focused to ensure 
services to the major metropolitan areas such as Baghdad.
130
 Under the CPA, many Iraqi villages 
were given electricity and running water where they were previously denied under Saddam’s 
regime. However, this was done at the expense of providing constant services to the major 
metropolitan areas, many of which had previously enjoyed some of the highest standards of 
living in the Arab world.
131
  
Iraq’s fragile infrastructure could not handle the new demands, and the administration 
could not improve it to do so. Many major cities, used to having a constant flow of services over 
the past thirty years, were now forced to ration them. The impact of the rationing was especially 
harsh in places like Baghdad where Saddam had previously prioritized in its maintenance. This 
would explain a survey taken by the Iraqi Research Institute in the autumn of 2004, which 
revealed that 70% of Iraq was unhappy with the availability of power.
132
 Shadid explains further 
as well, 
There wasn’t all that much love for the Americans in those days, as U.S. promises propelled Iraqi 
expectations. Of course, the weather didn’t help. Every day seemed to grow hotter as summer 
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arrived in Baghdad, a desert but for the Tigris…In most neighborhoods, residents were almost 
frantic in their complaints about basic needs remaining unmet – there was still not enough 
electricity to keep food from spoiling, not enough water to drink…133 
While U.S. efforts may have been strident, they did not yield adequate results to prove to the 
Iraqi people that the liberators had indeed implemented change. Rater, the portion of the 
population that was most vulnerable and sensitive to changes in living conditions experienced it 
in the opposite of what the Bush administration had intended it to be. 
The lack of basic utilities created a sense of mass disappointment among Iraqis. The 
Iraqis that greeted the arrival of U.S. and Coalition forces believed that the United States would 
eradicate Iraq’s growing poverty and transform the nation into a first world country similar to 
Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. Yet, as the occupation wore on, their liberators could not 
restore electricity for more than three-hour spurts throughout the day in many parts of the 
country.
134
 Other times, water would shut off without notice for prolonged periods. Many 
wondered about the prosperity they were promised.
135
 Shadid’s interaction with ISF police 
Sergeant Sami Jalil sheds light on these hardships for Iraqis, 
With water in short supply or of poor quality, he [Jalil] bought a bottle of mineral water every two 
days for his daughter – a cheap variety, but still another fifty cents. Sewage flooded daily into his 
home, where four families totaling thirty people shared six rooms. And, with electricity running no 
more than six hours a day in his neighborhood, he worried that the heat would make Rusul [Jalil’s 
daughter] ill. ‘The truth has revealed itself,’ Jalil said. ‘The Americans painted a picture that they 
would come, provide good things to the Iraqi people, spread security, but regrettably…’ His voice 
trailed off.136 
Tariq Talib, an Iraqi electrician explains further, “We expected the Americans would make the 
country an example, a second Europe. That’s why we didn’t fight back. And now we are 
shocked, as if we’ve gone back a hundred years.”
137
 Iraqis felt like they were moving back 
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towards the stone ages. Their liberation seemed to be short lived as they suddenly found 
themselves struggling to obtain life’s basic necessities. As a result, many began to question 
whether their supposed liberation had been a liberation at all.  
As time wore on, Iraqi disappointment turned into rampant discontent. The initial 
jubilation over Saddam’s removal was quickly diminishing as the U.S. occupation seemed to be 
worse than Saddam’s regime in its abilities to provide for the people. Saddam had managed to 
quickly restore basic services to localities in the aftermath of massive bombing campaigns 
directed at Iraq’s infrastructure during the Gulf War in 1991.
138
 Yet, the all-powerful Americans, 
with their wealth and technology well in sight, could not manage to do the same. Iraqis were 
baffled.
139
 Shadid explains Iraqi discontent as he recalls an encounter with Mohammad Hayawi, 
‘The mind of the Iraqi is on electricity. He wants to find a generator to get a little electricity in his 
house so that he can drink cold water.’ Other men in the shop nodded in agreement…‘Everyday at 
the Baghdad airport, the airplanes are taking off and landing. Is it possible the Americans cannot 
bring generators for power to improve the electricity here? Is it possible these are the same 
Americans who brought three thousand tanks, who brought three thousand artillery pieces in two 
days?’… ‘The tanks, the airplanes, and the supplies, and no generators?’ Mohammed recalled the 
1991 Gulf War…‘Saddam returned the infrastructure to the country in eighteen days.’140 
Many Iraqis could see the occupation fly in immense amounts of munitions and supplies for their 
own men, yet, Iraqis seldom saw the same efforts and mass shipments being done to restore the 
infrastructure.
141
 Many began to reconsider the goodwill of U.S. and Coalition forces. Either the 
occupation was grossly incompetent or malicious in its intent. Regardless, Iraqis began to feel 
that the occupation was overstaying its welcome. 
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The inability of U.S. and Coalition forces to provide security and stability in the 
increasingly violent streets of Iraq was perhaps the greatest source of Iraqi aversion and 
alienation. Crime, rape, theft, and murder flourished as disgruntled people and former criminals 
were free to roam and settle past disputes with blood. A poll taken in September of 2003 showed 
that 94% of Baghdad’s residents believed the city to be more dangerous than it was under 
Saddam, and 84% of Iraqis throughout the nation feared to go out at night for lack of security.
142
 
While the crime was largely carried out by outlaw Iraqis themselves, that fact remained 
irrelevant to public opinion. Riverbend demonstrates this sentiment in a blog post from August 
20, 2003, “America, as an occupying power, is responsible for the safety and security of what is 
left of this country…They have been shirking their duties horribly…”
143
As far as Iraqis were 
concerned, the U.S. invasion destabilized the nation in the first place. Moreover, if the 
occupation cared about the well-being of Iraq, then they would use their massive wealth and 
power to establish order.
144
 As time passed and Iraq remained stagnant in violence, many began 
to question the integrity and intentions of the Bush administration. 
While U.S. and Coalition soldiers were extremely vigilant and diligent in their efforts to 
provide Iraqis with safety, there were simply not enough boots on the ground to secure Iraq.
145
 
As Colonel Kevin Benson, one of the commanders to lead Phase IV military operations, said in 
2004,  
Iraq is a country bigger than California. This troop-to-task analysis was done to identify a 
minimum level of forces needed to exert some control over the populated areas of the 
country…We had fewer troops than Governor Schwarzenegger [of California] had police.146 
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As Chalabi’s predictions crumbled early on during the occupation, the Bush administration 
found itself in an unforeseen situation. With the new development came a set of issues that the 
U.S. occupation lacked the tools to address. As a result, the security situation spiraled out of 
control.  
Politics, constitutions, and democracy were all issues that Iraqis did not care about as 
long as they feared for the safety of their families in their own homes. Tribal leaders brought in 
by the CPA to discuss democracy in Iraq urged officials to establish security first before 
engaging in politics, “we have anarchy in the streets…we don’t care about a constitution right 
now, we need order”.
147
 In a poll taken from five different cities between November and 
December of 2003, 62% of the 1,167 Iraqis interviewed claimed that security was “the most 
urgent issue facing them.”
148
 An excerpt from Riverbend’s blog post on August 30, 2003 
demonstrates how dangerous the security situation was becoming,  
We…dragged E. out of the house…to go visit my aunt on the other end of the city. We heard the 
usual instructions before we left – stop at checkpoints, return before dark, and if anyone wants the 
car, give them the keys – don’t argue, don’t fight it…Being out in the streets is like being caught 
in a tornado. You have to be alert and ready for anything every moment…The looting and killing 
of today has changed from the looting and killing in April. In April, it was quite random. 
Criminals were working alone. Now they’re more organized than the CPA and the troops 
combined…By the time we got to my aunt’s house, every muscle in my body was aching…the 
cousin’s hands were shaking almost imperceptibly – knuckles still white with tension.149 
In the absence of security, protecting the population was the most pressing issue for the U.S. 
occupation. Simple everyday errands were now a dance with the devil as the streets of Iraq began 
to look more like the battlefront. All eyes were on the occupation to provide order, however, its 
efforts continued to fall short of containing the growing issue.  
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The lack of security, therefore, functioned as a crucial cog in the shift of Iraqi public 
opinion. As time wore on and an increasing number of Iraqis experienced tragedy, the initial 
elation of many turned into resentment and later into hatred.
150
 Luay Ali Hussein of Fallujah 
explains the quick shift from greeting the Americans in his city to turning against them,  
At first the Americans were welcome in Fallujah. They came saying they were liberators, and we 
felt they were. They freed us from a terrible regime. But people’s feelings toward them began to 
change as the occupation wore on…I began to think so too, even though I supported the 
invasion…Having the Americans in our city was painful for many people, including me.151  
Sergeant Jesus Boncanegra recalled this development as well from the American perspective,  
I sort of felt a shift in the people. When we got in, the little kids were dancing…everybody was 
clapping, ‘the Americans are here’…then 4, 5 months in the period, it just started getting 
like…real hectic, a lot of attacks and stuff. Just talking to regular Iraqi people, they’d by like, 
‘y’all could leave already.152 
Although there were many factors that contributed to the changing tide of opinion, security was 
the foundation for Iraqi support. While the American occupation spoke of a new Iraq with human 
rights and prosperity, Iraqis were looking over their shoulders out of fear for car bombs, 
kidnappings, or other forms of tragedy. It was impossible for any Iraqis to continue what support 
they may or may not have had within this tense climate.  
The insurgency that developed in the summer of 2003, therefore, was a product of 
discontent. If the Americans could not provide security, then Iraqis saw that they should be 
fought to compel them to leave. This sentiment was augmented with the growing belief that the 
American presence was a source of destabilization in itself. Rasheed Majeed, a resident of Najaf 
who joined the insurgency in late 2003, exemplifies the sentiment that an increasing amount of 
Iraqis began to adopt, 
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I took aim in the darkness towards the American positions as best I could and pulled the trigger. I 
knew I probably wouldn’t hit anyone. But at least they would know I was there. I just wanted to 
let them know that yet another person ready to fight them was there.153 
The hatred that pushed people like Majeed to the pull trigger on U.S. and Coalition troops was 
not an ideology instilled by Saddam or radical clerics. Rather, it was a blatant outcry that U.S. 
efforts to reconstruct Iraq were not working. Violence against the occupation was a response to a 
broken American promise in a land with a history of far too many.  
The security situation was exacerbated as foreign influence began to go unchecked. The 
small number of troops in Iraq allowed the nation’s borders to become porous. As a result, 
foreign extremist groups looking for jihad against Westerners began to flow in rather freely.
154
 
Staff Sergeant Mike Brase recalls the surprisingly high amount of foreign militiamen in Iraq 
during his tour between April 2004 and April 2005, 
…a lot of the times it wasn’t the locals who were the insurgents…it was people from other places 
that were usually the ones causing problems… I’ve fought people from Egypt, I fought people 
from Syria, Chechnya, Iran, Sudan…155 
Sergeant Phil Johnson of the 10
th
 Mountain Division recalls something similar as well during his 
tour between August 2005 to August 2006,  
It became a cause for everybody who hated America to come into Iraq. There were bounties. 
People were getting paid. If you killed an American you made money. So there were tons of 
outside soldiers who had nothing to do with that war, who didn’t give a shit about Iraq. They were 
just a group of terrorist organizations or what not who just hated Americans. They were coming 
into Iraq for the sole purpose of fighting and killing Americans.156  
The sudden influx of radicalized foreign militias caused serious issues for the American 
occupation as each group had its own political and religious agenda to adhere to, and was willing 
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to use Iraq as its battlefield while it pursued them, regardless of collateral damage.
157
 U.S. and 
Coalition troops, already bogged down by the insurgency, could not keep up with the growing 
security situation as a new battlefront opened up.  
Sectarian paramilitary organizations and religious militias also began to flow into Iraq as 
it became clear that their comrades in Iraq were not safe and living in appalling conditions. The 
Badr Brigade, a Shi’a paramilitary organization, was previously asked by U.S. intelligence to 
stay out of Iraq in the spring of 2003.For the most part, the Badr Brigade followed that request. 
Yet, as the situation began to deteriorate, members of the Badr Brigade insisted that they provide 
security to Shi’a neighborhoods themselves since the United States appeared to be incapable of 
doing so. By late 2003, a substantial amount of the organization had returned to Iraq.
158
 
Perhaps the best example of this trend lies with Muqtada al-Sadr, a highly popular Shi’a 
cleric and leader of the Mahdi Army. He moved into Shi’a neighborhoods early on as U.S. forces 
proved to be ineffective at providing security and stability. Sadr and the Mahdi Army were able 
to provide Iraqi neighborhoods with traffic services, waste services, food, protection, and police 
services.
159
 Sami Hilali, a truck driver from Huriya, recalls the stability and order that Sadr 
brought to his neighborhood,  
…gradually they started doing community services, things the government should have been 
doing but wasn’t. They organized trash pickups when no one else would. That was a big thing 
everyone in the neighborhood was happy about. They did traffic control, and posted night guards 
around the streets since police almost never entered. They would try to solve people’s problems, 
too. For example, a neighbor of mine was accidentally wounded by the Americans, and the Sadr 
Office paid his rent for seven months while he recovered…They distributed gasoline and kerosene 
when both were scarce. These were the kinds of things they did to give themselves a good 
reputation in the neighborhood. I have to admit they kept order on our streets, and we were 
grateful, especially in the early days of the looting.160  
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Sadr was able to gain the support of the people in these neighborhoods very quickly as he 
presented himself to be a far better candidate for leadership than the United States in an 
increasingly desperate situation. This contributed to the growing violence in Iraq because the 
Mahdi Army eventually declared jihad on the occupation, and Sadr’s aforementioned services 
provided it with a sizable pool of supporters and fresh recruits.
161
 
Iraq’s new population of foreign extremists and militants also destabilized the nation as 
they amplified the sectarian divisions amongst Iraqi society. A resurgence of fundamentalism 
developed as militias and extremist paramilitary organizations began to take over cities and 
implement terror campaigns targeting Iraqis of different religious sects.
162
 The increasing levels 
of violence drove a substantial amount of Iraqis to adopt the fundamentalist doctrines of their 
new foreign neighbors. In their desperation, Iraqis began to feel that faith would be the only 
thing to save them. Riverbend explains further in a blog post from August 23, 2003,  
We are seeing an increase of fundamentalism in Iraq which is terrifying…Every religion has its 
extremists. In times of chaos and disorder, those extremists flourish…There’s been an 
overwhelming return to fundamentalism. People are turning to religion…the first and most 
prominent reason is fear.163  
The chaotic environment acted as a self-perpetuating cycle of violence. Without adequate 
security, Iraqis instinctively fled to their faith for protection. As things became worse, their 
religious zeal increased.
164
 Although sectarian divisions seemed to be somewhat dormant in Iraq 
in early 2003, the aforementioned development allowed for them to rekindle and reach hostile 
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levels. This development greatly exacerbated the growth of violence and with it, the growth of 
fundamentalism as well. 
As time went on and fundamentalism continued to rise amongst the population, foreign 
militant groups had an easier time recruiting people and convincing them to use their faith to 
engage in jihad. Whether it was jihad against the Americans or other religious sects, the 
aforementioned tactic proved successful. As George Packer explained in his book The Assassin’s 
Gate: America in Iraq,  
It was one measure of America’s inability to achieve its goals in Iraq that a man like Bashir 
Shaker, who had everything to gain from the overthrow of Saddam and the opportunity it opened 
up, now felt himself pulled toward a harsher brand of Islam in reaction to the pervasive insecurity 
of the occupation.165 
The inability of the occupation to provide Iraq with security created the perfect vacuum for 
fundamentalism to flourish.  A completely new war developed as violence amongst Iraqis grew 
simultaneously to the violence aimed at the occupation. With these two trends entrenched, Iraq 
was well on its way to the events of 2006.   
Iraqis who refused to adopt fundamentalism and sectarianism also got caught up in the 
emerging civil war. Whether Iraqis supported civil war or not was irrelevant as many foreign 
militias and extremists used coercion to force Iraqis into participating with their religious 
military campaigns. Luay Ali Hussein, a Shiite resident of Fallujah, recalls this development,  
Foreign fighters began to drift into the city as things got tenser, Yemenis, Saudis, Moroccans, 
Palestinians, Lebanese. An uncountable number came. Thousands of them. They took over the 
whole city. Eventually…the foreigners outnumbered us…They began to run the place, ordering us 
around as though we were slaves to them…It was these foreign fighters who began to start with 
the sectarianism. I never had any troubles being a Shi’ite in Fallujah during all my years there. 
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Neither did other Shi’ites….But as the foreign fighters began to take over, Shi’ites like me were 
pushed to the side. We began to feel ignored and eventually threatened by these outsiders.166 
Sergeant Phil Johnson also provides valuable insight as to why Iraqis seemed unable to resist the 
will of the foreign militants who began overrunning their neighborhoods,  
It was just general fear. If they didn’t keep quiet about those people [foreign terror organizations 
and extremists] then those people would murder their wife and kids. We’re not gonna do that…so 
they [Iraqis] really feared them [terrorists and extremists]. Fear speaks…they became fearful of 
what the others could do, and without a steady presence of Americans there to protect them, cause 
you know we’d drive into town and then leave, well…they’re out of luck. They’d shut up and not 
help us because we weren’t there to protect them.167  
The Bush administration’s earlier decisions to keep troop levels as low as possible came back to 
haunt the occupation as sectarian tensions rose. U.S. and Coalition troops did not have the 
resources and muscle at their disposal to contain and thwart the growth of fundamentalism and 
sectarian violence. Thus, as time progressed and the occupation remained ineffective in securing 
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Strategy – How the United States Military Conceptualized the War 
While civilians implemented the Bush administration’s policies within the confines of the 
Green Zone, the average Iraqi interacted with the soldiers of the United States military on a daily 
basis.
168
 In this respect, the U.S. military acted as America’s ambassadors. Their mission was to 
demonstrate that the United States had come to liberate Iraq and usher in an era of stability and 
prosperity. Yet, America’s ambassadors were tragically unsuccessful in convincing Iraqis of the 
message they embodied. As Riverbend explained in October of 2004, “‘America’ has become 
synonymous with ‘empire,’ ‘hegemony,’ and ‘warfare.’”
169
 Although the ambassadors worked to 
associate America with liberation, many in Iraq began to associate it with the opposite as the war 
dragged closer to 2006.  
As the insurgency solidified in the summer of 2003, the military engaged in methods that 
were inherently counterproductive to their mission. Although the Bush administration’s absence 
of a comprehensive strategic vision left the U.S. military without the manpower, political 
framework, and essential resources to secure and stabilize Iraq, the military’s operations 
simultaneously made matters much worse. Lieutenant Colonel Gregg Reilly from the 3
rd
 
Armored Cavalry Regiment recalls this dynamic: “The tactical activities I conducted to bring 
security – tactical checkpoints, raids, and patrols – often had a destabilizing effect.”
170
 Given the 
circumstances, stabilization was already a daunting feat. However, the way in which the military 
conducted its operations made it virtually impossible. An analysis of how the U.S. military 
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operated both strategically and tactically may explain the failure to transcend its message and the 
immense repercussions that ensued as a result. 
CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks envisioned the war primarily as a 
conflict between the Coalition and Ba’athist enemy forces. He understood the military’s role for 
Iraq to be simple – to provide necessary conditions for regime change. In order to achieve the 
military’s task, Franks constructed an operational strategy that focused on destroying Saddam’s 
regime and continuing to eliminate all possible regime remnants after its destruction to ensure 
the successful establishment of a democracy. Phase IV reconstruction operations, therefore, were 
not a part of the military’s strategy.
171
 Rather, the military’s top command initially saw its 
mission in post-Saddam Iraq as a scaled-down continuation of offensive combat operations to 
weed out Ba’athist dead-enders.  
When Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez took command of Coalition forces in June of 
2003 and General John Abizaid took over Franks’s position as CENTCOM Commander in July 
of 2003, they both quickly realized the need for an entirely new strategy for Phase IV. Although 
Franks’s policy of actively and aggressively seeking out and destroying regime remnants was 
continued for several months under Iraq’s new command, Sanchez and Abizaid also realized that 
the war in post-Saddam Iraq was primarily one of hearts and minds.
172
 The two understood that 
the military’s mission to ensure conditions for successful regime change could only be achieved 
through securing and maintaining the support of the Iraqi people. They thus sought to construct 
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While Sanchez and Abizaid embodied a correct understanding of the nature of the war in 
2003, the operational strategy that they constructed did not. Sanchez realized that the key to 
winning the hearts and minds of Iraqis was establishing security. However, he ultimately devised 
a strategy for the U.S. military that was fundamentally enemy-centric. Sanchez’s plan for 
securing Iraq was simple – identity all of the insurgents and either kill or capture them.
174
 
Through eliminating all hostile elements in Iraq, Sanchez believed that the military could 
maintain a secure and safe environment for Iraqis, thus ultimately winning them over.  
Additionally, Sanchez envisioned intelligence to be a key component in his plan. He 
asserted that if Coalition forces had a deep understanding of who the enemy was, then they could 
successfully bring the fight to them and destroy them. This would eradicate the destabilizing 
factors within Iraq and allow the military to establish the foundation for prosperity. As Sanchez 
later explained,  
I was having multiple intel updates, understanding that…our effectiveness against the insurgency 
was going to come from our ability to harvest human intelligence…The only way you’re going to 
get yourself inside of their decision cycle and their operating system is by getting individuals to 
talk.175 
Intelligence, therefore, was the foundation of Sanchez’s strategic framework for Iraq. The 
military’s efforts would amount to nothing without an in depth knowledge of the elements they 
needed to remove from Iraqi society.
176
 The problem was that Sanchez could not see how to get 
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the intelligence without an active and aggressive campaign to gain accurate intelligence. His plan 
relied on intelligence to lead to military action. Yet his only means of acquiring that intelligence 
was through military action. Sanchez’s strategy for winning the war, therefore, was 
fundamentally conflicted by a paradox.  
Sanchez understood that security was essential to winning hearts and minds, but his 
methods for obtaining security undermined that very possibility. A U.S. Special Forces 
Lieutenant Colonel observed this strategic error in 2003, “What you are seeing here is an 
unconventional war fought conventionally.”
177
 Sanchez’s entire approach to securing Iraq relied 
on the large assumption that Coalition forces could successfully and accurately identify all 
sources of instability in Iraq, separate them from the population, and then destroy them with 
minimized collateral damage.
178
 Yet this strategic framework failed to realize the impracticality 
of successfully executing such operations without using a heavy hand and alienating substantial 
portions of Iraqi society. The U.S. military worked long and hard between 2003 and 2006 with 
the belief that they were working towards Iraq’s stabilization. In reality, the opposite was true 
and their tactics proved to be conducive towards destabilizing Iraq instead. 
How the United States Military Operated in Iraq Prior to 2006 
 In accordance with Sanchez’s strategic framework, the military embarked on a vigorous 
campaign to identity and destroy the insurgency’s roots.
179
 The campaign began on June 15, 
2003 with a nation-wide counterinsurgency operation known as Operation Desert Scorpion. This 
was the largest offensive maneuver since the invasion of Iraq, as it required resources from all 
elements of the V Corps – the entirety of America’s military force in Iraq. The focus of 
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Operation Desert Scorpion was to eliminate all remaining remnants of the Ba’athist regime as 
well as all forces hostile to the occupation or the Iraqi people.
180
 Sanchez’s campaign called for 
the military to rely heavily on human intelligence. That is, the sources of information as to who 
and where the enemy was needed to come from the population. In an effort to gain this type of 
intelligence, commanders used what little information they initially had to engage in cordon and 
sweep operations. 
Cordon and sweep operations became one of the operational centerpieces of the 
campaign to seek out the enemy and bring the fight to him. Essentially, units would go out on 
patrol and look for any sort of person they deemed suspicious. U.S. soldiers often times used 
what little intelligence they had to confront certain individuals, however, in the absence of such 
intelligence, they often confronted people based on personal opinion.
181
 Ricks explains further,  
The key to actionable intelligence was seen by many U.S. commanders as conducting huge sweeps 
to detain and question Iraqis. Sometimes units acted on tips, but sometimes they just detained all 
able-bodied males of combat age in areas known to be anti-American.182 
Staff Sergeant Mike Brase recalls his unit working under a similar mindset, 
…it’s funny cause here in America it’s so bad to racial profile, but there it’s ok. If you are a full 
African black man, you have no business being in Baghdad. There was nothing there for you other 
than to kill Americans. If we were driving around on patrol and we saw a group of black guys we 
would roll ‘em up and start interrogating them cause they had no business being there. Here in the 
States, the NAACP would be all over you, but there it’s like common sense…they’re not Arabic. 
Bringing the fight to the enemy and securing Iraq was quite the arduous task as few had an 
inkling of an idea of who the enemy was. In their strident efforts to identify the enemy, the 
military lost sight of their relations with the Iraqi people and the crucial role it played in 
stabilizing the nation. 
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 As units were constantly attempting to find Iraqis with potential intelligence value, they 
often times arrested innocent bystanders along the way. Without knowing whom the enemy was, 
many units concluded that the only practical thing to do was to detain all males of potential 
fighting age and send them to interrogation centers.
183
 Lieutenant Colonel David Poirier of the 
4
th
 Infantry Division recalls this view, “With the brigade and battalion commanders, it became a 
philosophy: ‘Round up all the military age males, because we don’t know who’s bad or who’s 
good.’”
184
 Although such operations may have been fairly effective in detaining insurgents or 
insurgent supporters, they also made wrongful arrests of civilians a high probability. For every 
insurgent captured during these operations, potentially dozens of Iraqis were simultaneously 
alienated as non-combatants were regularly caught up in the mix. By using blanket policies in 
cordon and sweep operations, the U.S. military antagonized a substantial portion of Iraqis when 
they otherwise could have avoided doing so
 185
 
 Indiscriminate detention most often took place in instances of enemy contact. When 
convoys were ambushed or struck by IEDs, units would engage in combat and frequently pick up 
males of fighting-age that were nearby while their veins were still laden with adrenaline and 
rage. Tony Lagouranis, a Military Intelligence (MI) interrogator recalled this trend in early 2004:  
Two of the prisoners were working in a field slightly removed from the IED but with a good view. 
They were hundreds of yards away, but they were the closest ones and that was reason enough to 
pick them up. The patrol went into town to question people. They got no information, but found 
one old man who acted evasive and suspicious. They arrested him too. 186  
This practice became common enough for the phrase “50-Meter Detainee” – detainees arrested 
for being within fifty meters of IEDs regardless of evidence pertaining to innocence – to became 
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somewhat of a standard military term.
187
 Gary Deland, a civilian contractor who helped to 
prepare Abu Ghraib prison as a military detention facility, observed this protocol in early 2003, 
“They [detainees] were picked up in sweeps, and nobody knew what to release them for. Their 
only charge might be ‘wrong place, wrong time’ literally written on their arrest sheet.” 
188
 In the 
frantic setting of urban warfare with an unidentifiable enemy, many units resorted to desperate 
measures to gain the intelligence their operations required. Regardless of the circumstances, 
these tactics did not help establish strong relations with the people they were tasked with 
protecting. 
 Cordon and sweep operations also incorporated the use of raids. While interrogating 
individuals picked up from patrols, military intelligence strived towards locating the pockets of 
anti-American sentiment. This intelligence was then used to lead missions, usually conducted in 
the middle of the night, to raid civilian houses suspected of housing or supporting the 
insurgency.
189
 It was commonplace for units to storm into target homes. While many raids were 
conducted by knocking first, allowing the residents a choice to open their door or have it kicked 
down, often raids were conducted without that option. Soldiers would then proceed to separate 




 Raids were problematic as they were frequently conducted on innocent civilian 
residences. Raids were usually a shot in the dark as units operated on intelligence that was vague 
at best. Entire blocks were regularly raided in search of a single potential insurgent. Yet in many 
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instances, units were on the completely wrong blocks.
191
 Marine Gunnery Sergeant Patrick 
Tracey recalls conducting a raid with abysmal intelligence,  
I had the feeling we were on another goose chase. Intel hasn’t been exactly on the money and we 
never know until the mission is over if they were right or wrong. Well, the mission is over and 
intel sucked as usual…all we did was scare the shit out of some women and children…192 
Captain John Brown of the 3
rd
 Armored Cavalry Regiment experienced similar results despite 
operating on intelligence gathered over four months, “Each male was asked his name. None of 
them matched the names on the list. It was the wrong house.”
193
 Although raids may have 
captured insurgents, weapons caches, and insurgent supporters at times, they most often yielded 
no results at all. Civilian harassment was largely the most common outcome. 
While raids were intended to be a means of providing security, soldiers lacked the 
intelligence resources necessary to achieve their strategic goals. Instead, raids often ended up 
alienating an innocent family rather than capturing an enemy of the state.
194
 Staff Sergeant T.J. 
Wesphal’s experience during his tour in 2003 can attest to the ineffectiveness of raids,  
Most of the people were terrified…we knew that this was not the way to win hearts and minds. 
You don’t come in the middle of the night and harass people and expect them to give you flowers 
the next day.195 
If being arrested for being at the wrong street at the wrong time was not a significant fear in itself 
for Iraqi civilians, being woken up in the middle of the night by armed men certainly was. Raids 
were strategically ineffective in the grand scheme of military operations in Iraq. They made 
sense on paper, yet in practice, they gave many Iraqis a reason to despise the American presence. 
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Considering that Iraqi support for the U.S. occupation was shaky at best, this was a 
surefire method to fail in winning the will of the people and sway the nation towards 
opposition.
196
 In hindsight, Major General John Batiste found cordon and sweep operations to be 
counterproductive: “Probably 99% of those people [detainees] were guilty of absolutely nothing, 
but the way we treated them, turned them against the effort in Iraq forever.”
197
 Cordon and 
sweep operations were a strategic failure. Although these tactics may not have completely 
alienated the majority of Iraqis, they also did little to win them over.  
 Cordon and sweep operations and raids were not a means to an end in themselves. The 
purpose of cordon sweep operations was to provide MI units with all possible suspects of the 
insurgency so that they could sift through them and identify the true enemies. Yet, as soon as 
detainees arrived at detention centers, they were usually regarded as captured enemies or enemy 
supporters. Suspects became perpetrators as soon as they were dropped off.
198
 As Colonel Joseph 
Cramer recalls,  
On a tactical level, I never saw anything – to include Abu Ghraib – that I would change. I include 
Abu Ghraib in that because everything that takes place in Abu Ghraib takes place in the Oregon 
State Prison, every day, every hour of every day…it was run like a prison. There were 
interrogations and everything else…but it was a prison. If you got into Abu Ghraib…you were not 
a nice guy. We weren’t just bringing little old guys off the street, you were there for a reason. Was 
Abu Ghraib a nice place? No, prisons aren’t supposed to be a nice place.199 
Although a sizable amount of criminals, insurgents, and terrorists were brought into detention 
centers, the aforementioned mindset does not take the flaws of cordon and sweep operations into 
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 Criminals should be treated as criminals in a combat setting. However, 
criminals are deemed that title after a fair trial – a process detainees never experienced before 
being subjected to imprisonment, intense interrogations, and occasionally abuse.  
 Tensions ran high in detention centers as units believed to be directly handling the enemy 
they hated so dearly. The upper echelon of the military exacerbated tensions as it put a great deal 
of pressure on both Military Police (MP) units and MI units to extract valuable intelligence at 
nearly all costs.
201
 Sanchez elaborates, “So we must push our interrogation to the limits of our 
authorities as defined by the Geneva Conventions. Each of you [MI interrogation officers] must 
know when our techniques are approaching the limits allowed, but you cannot cross those 
boundaries.”
202
 The top brass wanted to see a constant flow of intelligence coming from 
detention centers. However, its willingness to push and bend the limitations of international war 
law indicates flaws with its strategic framework as it implied to MI officers that abuse could be 
accepted if not encouraged.   
Under the intense push to obtain actionable intelligence for infantry units, detention 
centers soon became breeding grounds for abuse. Good men with strong moral fiber were pushed 
by the bureaucracy of the military to engage in highly questionable techniques to gain 
intelligence. While it was known that physical contact was prohibited and punishable under 
military law, MPs often used loopholes to obtain the same results. Tripping, shoving, and 
pushing detainees down stairs or into walls was ordinary at several facilities when the high 
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 Putting detainees in painful stress positions that simulated bones 
breaking and the exploitation of pressure points were commonplace because such techniques 
were not explicitly prohibited.
204
 In other instances, detainees were forced to drag their own 
genitals along gravel or rough pavement to get them to speak.
205
  
Arab sexual taboos were also exploited in detention centers with alarming frequency. 
Many prisoners were constantly naked and forced to wear women’s undergarments on their 
heads while in the presence of women.
206
 Detainees were constantly deprived of sleep as well. 
MPs and MI officers were required to give detainees only four hours of sleep per twenty-four 
hours. However, this regulation was regularly bent through breaking up detainees’ allotted 
amount of sleep in small increments within every twenty-four hour period.
207
 Abusing detainees 
became standardized in 2003 and continued to be somewhat usual even after the Abu Ghraib 
scandal went public in 2004.
208
  
Abusing detainees seemed to be an acceptable method to stabilize Iraq given the 
principles detention facilities were often ran with. This sentiment was amplified as many MPs 
and MI interrogators were told that getting detainees to speak would save American lives.
209
 
Sergeant Ken Davis recalls this belief in an interaction with Specialist Charles Graner,  
And he [Graner] says, ‘I’ve got a question for you. They’re making me do things that I feel are 
morally and ethically wrong. What should I do?’ And I [Davis] said, ‘Don’t do them.’ He says, ‘I 
don’t have a choice…Every time a bomb goes off outside of the wire…one of the OGA [Other 
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Government Agency] members would come in to say, That’s another American losing their life, 
and unless you help us get this information, their blood is on your hands as well.’210 
In the rush to obtain the information that all other military operations relied heavily on, detention 
centers lost sight of the crucial importance of establishing an image of America that ran counter 
to that of Saddam’s. Consequently, detention centers ultimately became a symbol of oppression 
and occupation for many Iraqis. 
Detention centers were in many ways the quintessential examples of the flaws of the 
military’s strategy. In order to extract the information needed to identify insurgents, prisoner 
abuse was essentially a prerequisite. Moreover, in order to extract the sources of such 
information from the population, indiscriminate arrests were also a prerequisite. An MI officer 
from a detention center in Babel explains further,  
…maybe not everyone’s [detainees at Abu Ghraib] guilty, but they know something. We’re 
casting a wide net. We’re going to get everyone we can…I’m not concerned about whether we 
have ‘evidence’ or not. We’re trying to stop an insurgency.211 
The constant need for prisoners of intelligence value and the simultaneous need to produce 
actionable intelligence created a toxic combination. Alienating the Iraqi population became an 
acceptable piece of collateral damage as the military remained set on finding and destroying the 
enemy.  
 When units were not engaged in cordon and sweep missions, they were most often on 
patrol in the streets of Iraq. The lack of troop strength made establishing a presence within many 
major metropolitan areas extremely arduous. The military attempted to compensate its lack of 
numbers with an excess of firepower and aggression. The idea was simple – to show insurgents 
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amongst the population that any attack on U.S. forces would bring a storm of destruction with 
devastating intensity.
212
 Gunnery Sergeant Patrick Tracy recalls the purpose of patrols,  
…to provide a presence and prove to these jackasses [the insurgents] nowhere is safe, and we’re 
willing to go into any part of town and into any house we want. This lets the good people know 
the terrorists need to fear us and we don’t fear the terrorists…of all the people on Earth, the Iraqis 
understand and respect that power resides with the most aggressive, committed, and ruthless 
person or group. Don’t for a minute think anyone forgets the last thirty odd years under Uncle 
Saddam. Guess what? There’s a new sheriff in town. That’s us!213 
An immense display of force regularly served as a means to deter any insurgent from 
destabilizing the security situation. While this tactic seemed rational in theory, especially when 
considering the military’s reoccurring issues with its troop strength, it was not a viable method 
for establishing a friendly image of America. Instead, it most often created an image of fear.
214
 
 In peacekeeping settings, patrols serve a twofold purpose. On the tactical level, they are a 
means to establish a steady presence within areas cleared of enemy activity. On the strategic 
level, they are a means to win the support of the people through displaying a concern for the 
population’s well-being. Aside from security, patrols are the military’s methods for establishing 
friendly and personal human contact with locals to foster relationships. Yet, the way in which the 
U.S. military conducted patrols focused too heavily on achieving the tactical goal. In doing so, 
they overlooked the strategic goal.  
American patrols between 2003 and 2006 were not very effective at the tactical or 
strategic levels because they were not necessarily conducted to protect the population. Rather, 
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they were overwhelmingly conducted to fight the insurgents.
215
 As Specialist Colby Buzzell 
states, 
Mounted patrols are also known as ‘movement to contact’ missions. The Army used to call them 
‘search and destroy’ missions…Movement to contact is when we would go strolling around the 
streets of Mosul in our Stryker vehicles to see if we could lure some terrorist or insurgent to take 
the bait and attack us.216 
Although patrols are supposed to be population-centric, they were strategically designed to be 
enemy-centric in Iraq. U.S. soldiers demonstrated to Iraqis that they were in their nation as 
combatants and combatants only – willing and eager to fight in their backyards. This did not help 
associate the United States with peacekeepers and partners of the Iraqi people.
217
 Openly inviting 
combat amongst the population centers did little to provide stability. Instead, it provoked 
belligerents to destabilize the nation further though establishing Iraq’s cities as the war’s 
designated battlefields.   
 Additionally, the establishment of patrols as an active combat mission instilled a 
combatant mindset amongst U.S. forces. Within this context, soldiers often behaved as any 
combat mission would regularly require – as ruthless warriors prepared to kill at any given 
moment.
218
 This mindset is necessary to ensure one’s survival and effective performance within 
a combat setting. In Iraq, however, it led to the treatment of all civilians as enemies. Sergeant 
Mario Mihaucich explains further,  
…for us [U.S. soldiers], one minute these people [Iraqis] were the enemy, and now it’s coddle and 
woo them. Two minutes ago, I was killing them. So now how do you flip a switch automatically? 
You really can’t…It’s very hard for us to go from the trigger pullers to basic peacekeeping.219 
Cavalry Scout Garrett Reppenhagen provides similar insight, 
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I’ve pointed my weapon at some of them [Iraqis], trying to push them away. I’ve hit them with my 
weapon to push them back…I know it wasn’t helping. It wasn’t building a love relationship with 
the Iraqi people. I wasn’t winning friends and influencing people. The environment I was in 
basically called for it.
220
 
This sort of behavior is warranted in regular, conventional wars. Iraq, however, was not a 
conventional war. As the top brass engaged in combat-oriented missions, it essentially ordered 
soldiers to win hearts and minds through brute force with an enemy that was indistinguishable 
from the population.
221
 Therefore, patrols were strategically at odds with the military’s mission. 
 The military’s inability to secure Iraq was also greatly exacerbated by its policy of 
operating out of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs). FOBs were used as a means of force 
protection. In an effort to minimize casualties amongst its relatively small force size, the military 
established large and impenetrable fortresses in remote locations outside of city centers.
222
 This 
greatly hampered the military’s ability to maximize the effectiveness of the resources it had at its 
disposal through regularly relinquishing territory to enemy fighters. Sergeant Phil Johnson 
explains this dynamic eloquently, 
…they way it worked was that you’d go out and do your mission and drive back. We had patrols 
around, and all they did was drive around and if they hit a roadside bomb or an ambush, then 
you’d fight that battle and then you’d just drive and leave. All you did was allow the bad guy to go 
and do the same thing again. It boils down to being the same thing as Vietnam. You’d go out on a 
patrol, get ambushed, fight, and then you’d leave. You never controlled any ground…there were 
no lines or anything. I think that due to the increasing violence, and whether that be the Iraqi 
population or what like I experienced with outsiders coming in, you needed to keep a more steady 
presence on the ground. Guys would go out on patrol all day and drive back and then the streets 
would be vacant all night. So they’d [insurgents or terror groups] place bombs and do all that and 
then the next day when they’d [American troops] go out they’d get blown the fuck up. So a more 
steady presence on the ground would prevent a lot of that from happening.223 
Given the circumstances of operating within an extremely hostile and unpredictable 
environment, prioritizing troop protection was indeed important. Yet, the military failed to 
understand that FOBs could also compromise the achievement of its mission if they separate 
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personnel from the population too much. The repercussions of using FOBs in an unconventional 
war was overlooked as units constantly gave up the security they established during the days to 
go back to the safeties of their bases at night. 
 Classic counterinsurgency doctrine demands for military forces to live and operate 
among the population they are attempting to protect. This creates an atmosphere of permanency, 
which renders the ability of insurgent activity to destabilize areas much more difficult. FOBs 
allowed the security situation to worsen as they isolated soldiers from the population that they 
were supposed to win over.
224
 As Colonel Peter Mansoor states,  
Baghdad simply could not provide the degree of semi-permanency necessary to keep the 
insurgents at bay inside the city. No matter how many daily patrols were sent outside the 
gates…you cannot commute to the fight – to protect the people of a city, units must be inside the 
city.225 
Without establishing any level of permanency, the military not only allowed for insurgent 
activity to continue but to increase in intensity as well. While the military fought extremely hard 
to quell the insurgency, operating out of FOBs rendered what success and progress units had in 
securing areas ultimately ineffectual in the grand scheme of the war.   
Moreover, operating out of FOBs amplified the influence of foreign militants. Adamant 
on stirring the pot of dormant Iraqi sectarian tensions, these groups continued to push the nation 
towards a bloody civil war as their influx remained largely unchallenged.
226
 Colonel Peter 
Mansoor explains further, “I believe had we remained positioned inside Baghdad to secure the 
Iraqi people…the sectarian cleansing that tore the fabric of Iraqi society two years later would 
not have occurred.”
227
 Sectarian civil war, therefore, became an increasingly inevitable 
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phenomenon as foreign fighters continued to gain footholds in Iraqi metropolitan areas. While 
soldiers roamed the streets during the day, foreign militants were often busy enticing sectarian 
tensions at night.  
Security at the degree required to win Iraqi hearts and minds was virtually impossible if 
units were not even living among the population. FOBs served as an operational solution to a 
tactical issue. The problem was that they also served as a tactical impediment to the greater 
strategic issue.
228
 Without understanding the truly damaging effects of FOBs in a peacekeeping 
and counterinsurgency setting, the U.S. military’s top command allowed for the situation in Iraq 
to spin out of control. Their failure to understand this dynamic guaranteed to lose the will of the 
people as limited military resources were used in some of the worst ways possible.  
The Iraqi Response – How the Liberators Became the Enemies 
Although the greatest contributing factors to the growing discontent among Iraqis were 
issues created by the civilian occupation, the U.S. military’s operations simultaneously 
contributed to this trend. Its policies pushed a substantial amount of Iraqis into opposition. 
Shadid’s account of Operation Peninsula Strike, a large-scale cordon and sweep operation in 
mid-June of 2003, explains further,  
More than two dozen homes were raided in the sweep through the town…About four hundred 
residents were arrested, all but fifty of whom were released after a few days at the makeshift 
detention center…The damage was done. Despite the releases, and the apologies issued by the 
military as they were freed, many residents of Thuluyah were already speaking of collective 
punishment when I arrived…Ibrahim Ali Hussein, a sixty-year old farmer…told me, ‘After this 
operation, we think one hundred Saddams are better than the Americans.’229 
While U.S. operations may have been somewhat effective in weeding out insurgents and other 
destabilizing elements of Iraqi society, they concurrently alienated the population and failed to 
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win their unabashed support.
230
 By 2004, most Iraqis had decided that the Americans were 
indeed occupiers. If this decision was not based on the utter inability of the occupation to provide 
security and services, then it was based on military tactics.
231
  
 The U.S. military’s combined use of cordon and sweep operations, detention centers, 
aggressive patrols, and FOBs established an image of malicious dominion among the population. 
Aside from being disgruntled by appalling living conditions, Iraqis soon began to feel 
intimidated by the Americans as well. After all, if one happened to live in a troublesome 
neighborhood, random apprehension and arrest was somewhat common.
232
 Riverbend recalled 
fear among Iraqis in August of 2003,  
People are terrified of the raids. You never know what will happen…who might react wrong – 
what exactly the wrong reaction might be…But the truth is, the raids only accomplish one thing: 
they act as a constant reminder that we are under occupation, we are not independent, we are not 
free, we are not liberated. We are no longer safe in our own homes – everything now belongs to 
someone else.233 
The effectiveness of raids in capturing insurgents was irrelevant as they were also surefire ways 
to provoke Iraqis into hatred. They served a tactical purpose for the military; however, to the 
average Iraqi, they served as a constant fear factor.
234
 The use of raids served no strategic value 
as fear did not offer Iraqis an organic desire to support and help the American effort in their 
nation. 
 Furthermore, cordon and sweep operations often served as a direct cause of instability 
and militancy. Iraqi men were forced to constantly watch over their shoulders in fear as convoys 
sped by urban areas. This did not bode well for winning the hearts and minds of a society 
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centered on strong male pride. Iraqi culture practically obligates men to retaliate to regain their 
honor if it is compromised through humiliation.
235
 Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Holshek 
recognized this development: 
He [Holschek] asked his commander to imagine himself the head of a household in an Iraqi 
village. ‘Two o’clock in the morning, your door busts open. A bunch of infantry guys burst into 
the private space of the house – in a society where family honor is the most important thing – and 
you lay the man down, and put the plastic cuffs on? And then we say, ‘Oops, wrong home?’ In 
this society, the guy has no other choice but to seek restitution. He will do that by placing a 
roadside bomb for one hundred dollars, because his family honor has been compromised…Simply 
to restore his own self-respect, the Iraqi would have to go out and take a shot at American 
forces.236 
Fawzi Saud and his relatives elaborate on Iraqi culture,  
Soldiers, they said, entered without knocking and without the men of the houses present. They 
kept their fingers on their triggers all the time…No rooms were left unsearched, they said, 
including bedrooms. ‘This is a violation of our dignity…They have no right to enter our house and 
search it. I’m not a soldier, I’m not a policeman, I’m not a party member…We have traditions and 
customs…For them it may be natural, but not for us. If an Iraqi had done this, we would have 
killed him.237 
While establishing security was indeed the key to establishing a strong foundation for Iraqi 
support, the military attempted to do so in a highly counterintuitive way. Cordon and sweep 
operations and raids created the foundation for Iraqi resentment. Commanders failed to realize 
that their tactics mirrored the image of an occupier. Indiscriminate arrests and midnight raids 
ultimately created an aura of terror – a trait not commonly associated with a liberator.   
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 Cordon and sweep operations were in many ways a perfect set-up for the instability that 
engulfed Iraq in the years leading to 2006. They pushed a population undetermined in its support 
into unrest and created a cause for armed resistance. Joining the insurgency or falling in with the 
ranks of foreign fundamentalist militias became increasingly attractive options for desperate 
Iraqi men. Iraqi blogger Salam Pax, a secular moderate, explains further,  
Think about it…if I wanted to instigate anti-American sentiments in a neighborhood which was 
until now indifferent towards the Americans, what would be the best thing to do? I would find a 
way to get the Americans to do bad things in that neighborhood. For example …make them go on 
house-to-house searches, tie up all the men and put sacks on their heads and scare all the children. 
This would tilt your American-o-meter from the ‘I-don’t-really-care’ position to the ‘what-the-
fuck-do-they-think-they-are-doing?’ position.238 
Shadid also recognized the ramifications of U.S. tactics, “…it [cordon and sweep operations] had 
huge repercussions. It created vendettas that I don’t think the American military understood they 
were creating.”
239
 Indifferent Iraqis often became hostile after experiencing cordon and sweep 
operations. These methods, therefore, defeated their own purpose through creating potential 
insurgents and militants in the pursuit to capture potential insurgents and militants.  
 If the massive arrests of Iraqi men was not enough to alienate individuals, then the 
treatment detainees received at detention centers certainly was. Iraqis became greatly resentful as 
detention centers descended into abuse and more men made their way through the system. 
Experiences at detention centers usually left released detainees vehemently against the American 
occupation and in support of any group in arms against them.
240
 Reporter Thanassis Cambanis 
with The Boston Globe could attest to this trend, “…the people who were being released were 
claiming that this experience was turning them against the United States and towards the 
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 Ra’ad Jamal Habib, an Iraqi bus driver who was wrongfully arrested during a 
raid and detained for a year at Camp Bucca detention facility, remembers his abuse vividly, 
I said, ‘Man, I didn’t serve in the regular army. Why the hell would I serve in the Mahdi 
Army’...And then he slapped me so hard I fell off the stool. I started to cry…Neither the guy in 
front of me nor the guy behind me knew why they had been arrested. None of us had a chance to 
talk much…No one knew what the charges against them were. All the arrest stories were more or 
less the same. People going about their normal daily lives suddenly surrounded by soldiers and 
taken away. We were laughing actually. Because that was exactly how Saddam used to do it. We 
used to hear stories about how America was a democratic country, a free country, that would never 
suppress people. I found the opposite to be true…Two led us into a room and told us to strip…We 
stripped to our underwear. They told us to take that off too, but we both said no. We’re people 
from the East, you know. It’s not in our culture to just take off our clothes like that. We were told 
again to take off our underwear. When we didn’t, one of the soldiers came and shoved me hard 
against the wall. Both of us started crying. We were terrified and humiliated. There was nothing 
we could do.242 
Treating all inmates as terrorists had an extremely damaging effect as it crushed all hope or 
optimism Iraqis may have previously held towards the United States. Conversely, detention 
centers served as blatant proof for Iraqis who were initially hostile towards the United States, 
thus, entrenching and amplifying their aggression. Regardless of how Iraqis felt about the 
American occupation before they were detained, sentiments toward the U.S. upon their release 
were predominantly the same – immensely hostile and determined for retaliation. 
Iraqis who made it out of their holding cells brought their often brutal and inhumane 
treatment back with them to their communities. While some believed the stories of abuse, the 
population as a whole usually treated them as rumors. Indeed, a substantial number of the 
prisoner abuse rumors circling Iraqi communities were either fabricated or loosely backed by 
evidence. When the Abu Ghraib scandal became a public sensation, however, nearly all of the 
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rumors in Iraq began to be treated as facts regardless of the evidence supporting them.
243
  As 
Riverbend said in late April of 2004,  
Those pictures are horrific…the most prominent feeling was rage…We’ve been hearing terrible 
stories about Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad for a while now, but those pictures somehow spoke 
like no words could. Seeing those naked, helpless, hooded men was like being slapped in the face 
with an ice cold hand. I felt ashamed looking at them…244 
While the Abu Ghraib scandal was only the tip of the prisoner abuse iceberg, it had some of the 
most damaging effects for the American image throughout the entirety of the war. Much of the 
goodwill demonstrated by soldiers instantly went down the drain.
245
 If the majority of Iraqis did 
not view the U.S. as an occupier by late 2003, the outbreak of the scandal in the spring of 2004 
did much to change that. 
 The shift in public opinion in the wake of the publicity of prisoner abuse is perhaps best 
exemplified in the sudden spike in violence that immediately followed the Abu Ghraib scandal. 
Scout Sniper Garrett Reppenhagen recalls the increase in violence,  
They’re fighting to the death. No Iraqi, no insurgent, wants to be captured by American forces 
now because they envision themselves in Abu Ghraib…There’s a huge fear in the Iraqi population 
and the insurgency that if they get captured, they’re going to be treated horribly. I knew that the 
entire Muslim world would just freak out. I knew the insurgency was going to escalate. It recruited 
tons more people to fight against us, and I knew that there’d be an increase in violence in sectors 
and that I’d have to deal with that. It happened. I mean, the violence definitely increased and 
people really changed their minds. The Iraqis that were on the fence pretty much jumped over on 
the side of the insurgency when news of what was happening at Abu Ghraib got out.246  
The treatment of detainees at detention centers fundamentally worked against the strategic 
mission of the U.S. military in Iraq as it created more unrest and instability. Prisoner abuse did 
little to keep insurgents and militants off the streets of Iraq and did much more to create them.
247
 
This significantly contributed to the deteriorating security situation as it created more enemies in 
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a battle zone that the Bush administration had previously rendered the U.S. military dreadfully 
handicapped to secure.  
 Aggressive patrols also facilitated the momentous shift in Iraqi public opinion. The way 
in which patrols were conducted did little to show the benevolence of the U.S. military as Iraqis 
were constantly being treated as enemies.
248
 Soldiers pointing their guns at civilians were a 
common grievance among Iraqis.
249
 Sami Jalil, a Sergeant with the ISF, explained how the 
average Iraqi felt around patrols, “They’re [U.S. soldiers] arrogant. They treat all the people as if 
they’re criminals.”
250
 Mohammad Ghani, a native of Baghdad and initial supporter of regime 
change, also shared similar views of patrols, “They treat us like cowboys…they use guns. They 
don’t respect us. They don’t know anything about the Iraqi character, the culture of Iraq, the 
history of Iraq. Saddam destroyed the character of the person, now they’ve destroyed the 
country.”
251
 In their strident efforts to bring the fight to the enemy as a means to establish 
security, the U.S. military ultimately alienated the population as it struggled to make the 
difference between friend and foe.
252
 Given the constant struggle to identify the enemy, soldiers 
were forced to treat Iraqis with a degree of hostility as a means to ensure their own survival. Yet, 
in the process, Iraqis began to build up barriers of their own towards U.S. forces as well.  
A Marine patrol conducted on April 13, 2003 is perhaps one of the best examples of how 
these tactics contributed to Iraqi estrangement. During patrol, a Marine unit came across a Friday 
prayer service in a Sunni town. They decided to enter the service to check for any possible 
insurgent operatives or suspicious activity. However, they did so with loaded rifles, as if they 
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were on a combat mission. Entering a religious service on the Muslim holy day with weapons 
was deeply disrespectful to the followers, and they immediately became extremely agitated. The 
soldiers, however, refused to leave until their mission to seek out the enemy was finished so that 
the area could be deemed clear.
253
 Reporter Nir Rosen recalls the tense situation,  
I went up to the officer and I told him, ‘Hey man, it’s Friday prayers, people are angry, you 
shouldn’t be here,’ and he told me something like, ‘I don’t care, that’s why we’ve got the 
guns’…It was so tense that it was amazing that it ended peacefully – they just walked away. The 
crowd was very, very, angry.254 
This is an early indicator of the immense repercussions that were to come from patrols. The unit 
was not achieving its strategic objective as their operations gave Iraqis a reason to support the 
resistance rather than the occupation. Unfortunately, early examples of the agitation that patrols 
created were either ignored or not understood.  
The nature of patrols as seek and destroy operations required soldiers to isolate 
themselves. Interactions with the crowds were limited as the military operated on the perception 
that all civilians were potential enemies until their benevolence was proven. Convoys usually 
sped through towns without stopping and soldiers were often holding their rifles at the ready 
position as they searched for potential targets.  The 3
rd
 Brigade Combat Team of the 101st 
Airborne Division was one of many units that did not receive positive results from these 
methods: “Overall, the unit had extremely poor relations with the Iraqis who felt that the U.S. 
soldiers were violent and arrogant; while the U.S. soldiers believed that nearly all Iraqis were the 
enemy.”
255
 The patrols did not prioritize the establishment of personal relationships with the 
locals. As a result, America’s ambassadors lost an opportunity to make leeway in winning the 
hearts and minds of Iraqis through daily interaction. 
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As Americans roamed the streets of Iraq with immense firepower, Iraqis found it difficult 
to view them as the harbingers of prosperity and stability. Instead, it was much easier to view 
them as occupying warriors – thirsty for combat. Abu Mustapha, an Iraqi bureaucrat, shared this 
sentiment,  
I had never seen such soldiers before and did not know what to make of them, honestly. They had 
all this equipment and strange eyewear and were always pointing weapons around. I felt scared 
whenever I saw them. And embarrassed, especially if my wife was with me. We didn’t know what 
they might do…I had read in history about the armies that had captured Baghdad, like the 
Mongols. I never thought I would be forced to watch an army enter Baghdad in my lifetime. It’s 
not easy to witness such a thing…I cried many times during those days.256 
Aggressive patrols did little to gain Iraqi respect for attempting to secure the nation and failed to 
invite them to support the American cause.
257
 Major William Brent Chastain explains the 
repercussions of aggressive patrols further, “As the Americans appeared more and more like 
wanton, faceless occupiers, the local Iraqis were less likely to assist them against the 
insurgency.”
258
 Patrols established an impersonal and ferocious image of America instead of the 
symbol of benevolence they needed the Iraqis to accept. Resentment brewed until it transformed 




The alienating effects of cordon and sweep operations, detention facilities, and overly 
aggressive patrols were exacerbated by the military’s policy of operating out of FOBs. FOBs 
fundamentally hindered the military’s ability to demonstrate its intentions to Iraqis as they 
created a barrier between the two.
260
 Although many soldiers were benevolent and determined to 
help create a better life for Iraqis, the population seldom saw these characteristic traits of a 
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 Rather, they overwhelmingly observed street-side battles, indiscriminate arrests, and 
overly aggressive demeanors – all classic traits of an occupier.  
These trends had a devastating impact on Iraqi opinion. As Riverbend said in May of 
2004, “There was a time when people here felt sorry for the troops…That time has 
passed…People look at troops now…and we burn with shame and anger and frustration at not 
being able to do something.”
262
 As the occupation wore on without basic services or security and 
the military’s heavy-handed tactics simultaneously continued to alienate the public, the answer to 
the question on almost every Iraqi’s tongue soon became apparent. The majority of Iraqis 
concluded that the United States had indeed come to their nation as occupiers. In losing any 
chances of securing Iraqi support, the United States military greatly contributed to the growing 
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 Few could foresee the eventual calamity of the Iraq War when it officially began on 
March 20, 2003. After all, Rumsfeld’s military makeover proved to be exceedingly effective as it 
took U.S. and Coalition forces approximately three weeks to enter Baghdad and end Saddam’s 
regime on April 7, 2003.
263
 In hindsight, President Bush’s declaration of total victory less than a 
month later was perhaps, in itself, the greatest indicator of what was to come in 2006, as it 
suggested a grave misinterpretation of the nature of the Iraq War. In analyzing their pre-war 
planning and post-invasion operations, it is clear that the Bush administration mistook the Iraq 
War to be a fight against Saddam Hussein, whereas in reality, it was a fight for the will of the 
Iraqi people. In their misunderstandings, the administration adopted a strategy that completely 
overlooked the decisive issues at stake, and thus, was doomed to lead Iraq into darkness.  
While Saddam Hussein’s removal was required for democracy to follow, it was never the 
key to establishing a new, democratic Iraq. The Bush administration failed to understand that 
Saddam was merely the tip of the iceberg. The key to the Iraq War rested within the hearts and 
minds of every single Iraqi citizen. It was never a war that the administration could win with 
bullets or democracy. Rather, it was a war that could only be won with the establishment of a 
stable Iraq and the reassurance of a prosperous future. Transforming Iraq into a beacon of light 
for the entire Middle East was always a separate conflict, which simply required the absence of 
Saddam Hussein as a prerequisite. 
The Bush administration seemed to have misconstrued and inverted this nuance as it 
concluded that Iraq would essentially reconstruct and democratize itself. In expecting Phase IV 
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to be a walk in the park, the Bush administration became increasingly bogged down with the 
removal of Saddam Hussein. This caused the administration to lose sight of transforming Iraq 
into the region’s symbol of Western prosperity – their greater political objective. Although 
initially Saddam’s removal was to serve as the stepping-stone for pacifying the Middle East, 
regime change became an end in itself. Colonel Cramer’s experience exemplifies this 
development, 
‘Mission Complete’…well mission was complete, we had gone up there, beaten him, we had 
destroyed his army, he was on the run very quickly…this is what the mission was. It wasn’t until 
after that we went into the nation building and the peace keeping. We were never in a peace 
keeping mode…peace enforcement is a completely different mentality. Peace enforcement is a 
step below combat. So, they changed the mission and they extended us. We were going to come 
home…I mean, we had all marked it on our calendars…you know, September we’re home. Then 
about August, they said, ‘nope, everybody is here for a year’ and we were like, ‘what the fuck!’ 
But they didn’t send anymore troops over even though they extended us and extended our mission 
to be completely different…264 
Army Major Michael Eisenstadt had a similar reflection as well, “When President Bush landed 
on that carrier with the ‘Mission Accomplished’ banner, it was right: The mission, as defined for 
the military as getting rid of the regime, had indeed been accomplished”.
265
 While Rumsfeld’s 
revamping of the military created a far more effective fighting force, it also shifted the focus of 
the war. His reconstruction of U.S. forces designed it to be capable of achieving Phases I-III, 
military operations up to and including the removal of Saddam Hussein, and little more. 
Although the theoretical goal of the U.S. military in Iraq was to establish necessary conditions 
for the reconstruction of the Iraqi political apparatus, removing Saddam Hussein from power was 
now, in reality, its central purpose.  
The Bush administration was willing and eager to enter Iraq with virtually no viable 
strategy for Phase IV because the grand strategy they adopted did not understand Phase IV to be 
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the center of gravity. Rather, Phase IV was perceived to be the aftermath of victory instead of the 
final step to victory that it actually was.
 266
 The administration’s strategy asserted that extensive 
military operational planning would achieve their political objectives in Iraq. It was a conclusion 
based on the mistaken assumption that a direct fight with Saddam Hussein would lead to a stable 
and democratic Iraq.
267
 With these conclusions in mind, the Bush administration was completely 
oblivious to the decisive factors at stake. Security, economic stability, and basic living conditions 
were never a part of the administration’s strategy as popular support was crucially and fatally 
overlooked.   
Additionally, the U.S. military’s fundamental misunderstanding of the war ran parallel to 
that of the Bush administration’s. Although the top brass were aware that winning the hearts and 
minds of the Iraqi population was central to victory, the enemy-centric strategy it implemented 
demonstrated a gross lack of awareness of the dynamics and nuances that a war for hearts and 
minds inherently embodies.
268
 In opting to operate with an enemy-centric approach, the military 
too overlooked the decisive issues at stake as it fought the wrong war. Insurgents and militants 
were never the true enemy. The real enemy to America’s mission in Iraq was the precarious 
nature of the will of the people.  
In its pursuit to kill all insurgents and militant forces, the military neglected the fact that 
it was destabilizing the situation further. The issues with Sanchez’s enemy-centric strategy and 
the pathways to destabilization it both contributed to and created are apparent in Gunnery 
Sergeant Patrick Tracey’s reflection on routine raids, 
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Occasionally, I feel sorry for these people, but if they come up on a target list…I no longer feel 
any remorse…I know, I know, what if they’re innocent, right? What if someone gave bum scoop 
or Battalion has bad info? How about TFS and TFB, as in tough fuckin’ shit or too fuckin’ 
bad…We go where we’re told and do what we’re told and if that takes assholes off the streets, or 
weapons and such out of the hands of the enemy, then a few hurt feelings along the way don’t 
mean dick to me.269 
The military’s willingness to alienate portions of Iraqi society during its campaign to destroy 
hostile forces is a clear indicator that it overlooked the crucial factors at stake. A few hurt 
feelings, in fact, go a long way to hinder an institution’s ability to win a war when the conflict is 
primarily about hurting as few feelings as possible. This is a basic and central pillar of the Iraq 
War that the military’s top command either did not understand or purposefully ignored as it 
chose to continue fighting the war with a conventional mindset.
270
 
  Although the Bush administration left the military with a great handicap to achieve its 
arduous mission in Iraq, U.S. forces threw out any possibilities of success they may have had in 
early 2003 through fighting the war in a manner guaranteed to lose popular support rapidly. 
Lance Corporal Travis Williams explains further,  
There’s no way that you can go in repeatedly into these people’s houses, search through 
everything they own, put their women and their children in a room, you scare the crap out of them 
every morning, and honestly believe that you’re making anything better. Sometimes we offered 
medical aid to people who were sick, or we went in and fixed something, but for the most part I 
would say that searching these people’s houses constantly over and over, kicking them out of the 
house and staying in their house overnight and doing stuff like that, that just doesn’t win over the 
public opinion.271 
Sanchez’s strategic framework was ideal for winning a battle against conventional combat 
forces. Yet, the same strategy does not yield the same results when the enemy fights 
unconventionally and gains strength through popular support. In fighting the wrong war, the 
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Iraq was prone to plummet into mayhem and civil war from the beginning, as Saddam’s 
removal created utter instability – the perfect element to promote anarchy and reawaken 
dormant, yet ever-present sectarian tensions. The adoption of a strategy that understood how 
critical Phase IV would be, however, could have led the Bush administration to prevent these 
threats from developing. Yet, through adopting a strategy rooted in fighting a war contrary to the 
realities of Iraq, the Bush administration made what was to come in 2006 and 2007 highly 
probable. The military simultaneously transformed those possibilities into inevitability as it 
adopted a strategy that exacerbated the issues at stake. The volatile combination of these two 
themes rendered the task of winning the will of the Iraqi people to be impossible. As 
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